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In 2001, the Uniform Law Commission adopted the Uniform Trust 
Code, which regulates certain aspects of trusts.1 One impetus for the trust 
code was the ever-increasing popularity of revocable trusts as part of stand-
ard estate planning packages. Another was the fact that few states—
including Arkansas—had well-developed common law trust rules, let alone 
any statutory trust codes. In 2005, the Arkansas legislature enacted a slightly 
modified version of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), titled the Arkansas 
Trust Code (ATC).2 At that time, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
Law Review published my article summarizing the most important features 
of the new Trust Code, compared and contrasted with the then-current Ar-
kansas common law of trusts.3 Since then, over ten years have passed, ren-
dering further commentary timely. This update addresses two broad themes. 
Part II examines how the ATC has fared in Arkansas courts. Part III dis-
cusses some recent aspects of Arkansas trust law not covered by the ATC. 
Overall, the cases and statutes discussed herein are examined in the context 
of how they affect estate planning and administration. 
II. THE ARKANSAS TRUST CODE AND INTERPRETIVE CASE LAW 
The cases in this section deal with the ATC, in rough order by the nu-
merical order of ATC provisions. Since 2005, Arkansas cases have inter-
preted an array of ATC sections dealing with the common law of trusts and 
rules of construction; transfers of property into and out of trusts; cy pres and 
equitable deviation; modification and termination of trusts; revocability of 
joint trusts by a surviving settlor; duties of trustees; and attorney’s fees. 
 
 *  Arkansas Bar Foundation Professor of Law, University of Arkansas Bowen School 
of Law. This article was completed with the assistance of a grant from the UALR Bowen 
School of Law. I also thank Ashley Haskins and Brant Perkins for their review and advice, 
and Professor Lindsey Gustafson for hers as well. I could not ask for better colleagues. 
 1. UNIF. TRUST CODE, 7C U.L.A. 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006 & Supp. 2015) [herein-
after UTC]. The act is also available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust_code/ 
UTC_Final_rev2014.pdf. 
 2. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-101 to -1106 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
 3. Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 191 (2005). 
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A. The Common Law of Trusts and Rules of Construction 
Section 106 of the ATC, a type of section occurring in many uniform 
laws, states that both the common law of trusts and principles of equity sup-
plement the trust code.4 The Supreme Court of Arkansas invoked this sec-
tion of the ATC when deciding a case of first impression that could have 
served as a final exam question in a course on wills and trusts: whether a 
remainder interest created by a revocable trust is contingent, or whether it is 
vested subject to divestment.5 In 2000, William and Annie Fowler created a 
joint revocable trust, funded by both their separate and joint property.6 When 
the first spouse died, the trust was to become irrevocable.7 On the death of 
the second spouse, the jointly owned property and William’s property was 
to be distributed to his two stepchildren and ten of his nieces and nephews.8 
Annie’s property was to be distributed to her three children.9 Annie died in 
2001.10 During the following ten years before William died in 2011, his two 
stepchildren died (both survived by issue) and his nephew died without is-
sue.11 The trustee contended that the interests of all three beneficiaries 
lapsed, but the surviving issue disagreed.12 The trial court ruled that the ben-
eficiaries’ interests did not vest until both settlors died, citing a provision of 
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.13 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed.14 Considering case law from 
other states, it found that the “great weight of authority” holds that a benefi-
ciary’s interest under any inter vivos trust (even a revocable trust) is vested 
(although not possessory) at the time the trust is created.15 Thus, instead of a 
remainder beneficiary’s interest being a contingent interest, dependent on 
surviving the settlor, the remainder beneficiary’s interest in a revocable trust 
is vested, subject to divestment only if the trust is revoked or amended.16 In 
 
 4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-106 (Repl. 2012). 
 5. Tait v. Comty. First Trust Co., 2012 Ark. 455, at 5, 425 S.W.3d 684, 686. 
 6. Id. at 2, 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 7. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 8. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 9. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 10. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 11. Tait, 2012 Ark. 455, at 2, 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 12. Id. at 2–3, 425 S.W.3d at 685. 
 13. Id. at 6, 425 S.W.3d at 687. The Restatement section relied on by the circuit court is 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112m cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 3d ed. 1967). As the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas noted, however, this section concerns testamentary trusts, and not 
inter vivos trusts. See Tait, 2012 Ark. 455, at 6–7, 425 S.W.3d at 687. 
 14. Tait, 2012 Ark. 455, at 8, 425 S.W.3d at 689. 
 15. Id. at 7, 425 S.W.3d at 688. 
 16. See id., 425 S.W.3d at 688. 
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this case, the trust was irrevocable by the time the remaindermen died, so 
they would have held indefeasibly vested remainders at their deaths.17 
The court noted that the ATC is silent on this issue, but it does author-
ize reliance on the common law of trusts.18 The court relied on its language 
in Sutter v. Sutter, where it stated that an inter vivos trust “passed an interest 
in the res to the beneficiaries during the life of the settlor, even though pos-
session . . . thereof was postponed until the death of the settlor.”19 Finally, 
the court stated that it was not deciding here whether Arkansas’s anti-lapse 
statute for wills would also apply to inter vivos trusts.20 
One issue remains after this decision, however, which the court did not 
discuss explicitly. If the interest of the remaindermen is vested, then it 
would pass to the probate estates of the remaindermen, not necessarily to 
their heirs.21 To illustrate, if one of the remaindermen here had devised his 
entire estate to a charity, the charity would ultimately receive the trust as-
sets. On the other hand, if the remainderman died intestate, the trust assets 
would pass to his heirs. In this case, it was the issue of the remaindermen 
who sued so presumably the remaindermen died intestate.22 
This rule of future interests is different from the Arkansas antilapse 
statute applicable to expectancies in wills, which distributes a devise to a 
predeceased descendant of a testator to the descendant’s issue.23 The differ-
ence in the law exists for a reason: future interests are not the equivalent of 
expectancies. Future interests are enforceable property interests, unlike ex-
pectancies. Tait reminds us that default rules of will construction—here the 
rule of lapsed devises—do not necessarily carry over to inter vivos trusts. 
Planners should heed this case and be sure to provide alternative disposi-
tions, if desirable, to be made should a remainderman fail to survive the 
settlor. In fact, even if the intended alternative taker is the default taker, it 
does not hurt to include the gift-over expressly; the provision will be evi-
 
 17. See id. at 2, 7, 425 S.W.3d at 685, 688. 
 18. See id. at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 686; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-106 (Repl. 2012). The 
Uniform Law Comment to this section explains that the UTC only codifies those portions of 
the common law of trusts “most amenable to codification.” UTC, supra note 1, § 106 cmt. 
 19. Sutter v. Sutter, 345 Ark. 12, 18, 43 S.W.3d 736, 740 (2001) (citing United Bldg. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460, 465 (1946)). 
 20. Tait, 2012 Ark. 455, at 10, 425 S.W.3d at 689. 
 21. See SHELDON KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
161 (5th ed. 2011). 
 22. See Tait, 2012 Ark. 455, at 2–5, 425 S.W.3d at 685–86. 
 23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104(2) (Repl. 2012). Arkansas’s anti-lapse statute distrib-
utes property devised to a predeceased descendant of the testator to the descendant’s issue. Id. 
If the descendant has no issue, the devise lapses into the residue. See id. If the descendant was 
the sole devisee of the residue of the estate and left no heirs, the residue passes intestate. See 
id. If there were additional devisees of the residue and the descendant died heirless, the other 
devisees of the residue receive the descendant’s share pro rata. See id. 
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dence of intent. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas’s decision is in line with the traditional common law, and not the Uni-
form Probate Code (UPC), which in its highly controversial section 2-707 
has tried to extend the law of antilapse to trust remainder interests.24 
The ATC states “[t]he rules of construction that apply in this state to 
the interpretation of and disposition of property by will also apply as appro-
priate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition of trust 
property.”25 The rationale for the UTC provision is that a revocable trust is a 
will substitute; therefore, the rules for interpreting the disposition of proper-
ty at death should be the same.26 In Tait, the court cited this provision but 
declined to follow it, in refusing to apply the wills anti-lapse doctrine to 
revocable trusts.27 
B. Children Can be Left Behind, or Pretermitted by Inter Vivos Trusts 
Like Arkansas’s anti-lapse statute, the pretermitted child statute is an-
other statutory rule of construction applying to the interpretation and dispo-
sition of property by will. It gives a child unmentioned in a will, either ex-
pressly or as a member of a class, the share of the testator’s estate that the 
child would have received had the testator died intestate.28 In Kidwell v. 
Rhew, the decedent created a revocable trust but no will, and so died intes-
tate, but with effectively no property outside of the trust.29 Kidwell, a pre-
termitted heir, sought to enjoin Rhew, the successor trustee and decedent’s 
daughter, from disposing of some of the trust assets, arguing that Arkansas’s 
pretermitted child statute should apply also to inter vivos trust dispositions.30 
The court denied the request, interpreting the statute to apply only to proper-
ty passing by will.31 Kidwell, effectively disinherited by the trial court’s 
 
 24. For articles critical of the UPC approach, see, for example, David M. Becker, Erod-
ing the Common Law Paradigm for the Creation of Property Interests and the Hidden Costs 
of Law Reform, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 773 (2005); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code 
Upends the Law of Remainders, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309 (1996). For a brief discussion of Tait 
and a helpful comparison of the traditional contrast between the antilapse law of wills and the 
law of remainders, see Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod, “I’m Not Quite Dead Yet!” Rethinking the 
Anti-Lapse Redistribution of a Dead Beneficiary’s Gift, 61 CLEVE. STATE L. REV. 1017 
(2013). 
 25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-112 (Repl. 2012). See generally Alan Newman, Revocable 
Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 523 (2008), for 
discussion of where the law of wills is, and is not, an appropriate fit for revocable trusts. 
 26. UTC, supra note 1, § 112 cmt. 
 27. Tait v. Cmty First Trust Co., 2012 Ark. 455, at 5, 425 S.W.3d 684, 686. 
 28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-407(b) (Repl. 2012). 
 29. Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 491, 268 S.W.3d 309, 310 (2007). 
 30. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 310. Apparently there were no assets because the court closed the 
probate estate without an administration. See id., 268 S.W.3d at 310. 
 31. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 310. 
2016] ARKANSAS'S TRUST CODE AND TRUST PLANNING 305 
ruling, appealed.32 The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, noting the 
plain meaning of the statute, “if, at the time of the execution of a will. . . .”33 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, did not cite the ATC “rules of con-
struction” provision in its decision, but rather focused on the plain meaning 
of the statute, emphasizing the differences between wills and trusts.34 The 
court chose to apply the plain meaning of the narrower pretermitted child 
statute over the general statute calling for application of the rules of will 
construction to trusts. In the choice between a general statute and the plain 
meaning of a specific statute, it is probably too much to expect that a court 
will ignore the plain meaning of the specific, narrower statute. 
Is it necessarily a bad thing that omitting a child’s name from an inter 
vivos trust means the child will get nothing? An argument against the pre-
termitted child statute is that a testator drafting her own holographic will or 
inter vivos trust, unaware of the law, would assume that by not mentioning 
her child she would disinherit the child. Instead, by one of the law’s ironies, 
she has now given him an intestate share of her probate estate. Indeed, some 
states do not allow an omitted child a share unless the child was born after 
the execution of the will.35 On the other hand, an argument for the pretermit-
ted child statute is that in cases of undue influence, the procurer of the will, 
also unaware of the law, would omit the child’s name thus dooming the pro-
curement. This case calls attention to the importance during drafting of a 
tactful question about the existence of other children, or wording that explic-
itly excludes any unnamed children—as long as there is no possibility of 
after-born marital children. 
C. Trust Property, Yes or No? 
Several appellate decisions issued since the enactment of the ATC con-
cern whether property was transferred into a trust at its creation, or into or 
out of a trust at some later point in time. The ATC provides that a settlor 
may create a trust by “declaration by the owner of property that the owner 
holds identifiable property as trustee.”36 In such cases, where a settlor wish-
es to be the trustee of her trust (as is usually the case with revocable trusts), 
the settlor’s trust instrument is traditionally known as a declaration of trust. 
It is common practice to attach a schedule listing the trust assets. Is this 
 
 32. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 310. 
 33. Id. at 492, 268 S.W.3d at 311 (emphasis in original). 
 34. It should be noted that testamentary trusts are subject to the pretermitted child statute 
because a testamentary trust is part of a will. See Alexander ex rel. Alexander v. Estate of 
Alexander, 351 Ark. 359, 93 S.W.3d 688 (2002) (declining to apply the pretermitted child 
statute to a testamentary trust, but for another reason). 
 35. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-302 (West 2016). 
 36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-401 (Repl. 2012). 
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schedule sufficient to transfer assets, even if the assets are real property? 
Even if it is sufficient, is it the best practice? The law is willing to give set-
tlors some leeway. The UTC Comment states: 
A trust created by self-declaration is best created by reregistering each 
of the assets that comprise the trust into the settlor’s name as trustee. How-
ever, such reregistration is not necessary to create the trust . . . . A declara-
tion of trust can be funded merely by attaching a schedule listing the assets 
that are to be subject to the trust without executing separate instruments of 
transfer. But such practice can make it difficult to later confirm title with 
third party transferees and for this reason is not recommended.37 
Arkansas cases have followed the spirit of this comment, beginning 
with Sutter v. Sutter, a pre-ATC case in which the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas upheld the transfer of real property to an inter vivos trust despite the fact 
that the settlor quitclaimed the real estate in question from himself as an 
individual to himself as an individual and not as a trustee.38 In Ashley v. Ash-
ley, decided in 2012, the decedent had executed a family limited partnership 
(FLP) agreement, a pour-over will, and a revocable trust all on the same day 
in 1997.39 The decedent and his four children by a previous marriage were 
the partners of the FLP, which held real estate.40 In 1998, the decedent’s 
percentage share as limited partner was amended to be 96.3188%.41 A 2004 
amendment to the partnership agreement provided that the decedent’s wife 
would receive this interest at his death, and that the partnership would pur-
chase the interest from her for $5 million, unless either party did not believe 
the interest was worth that amount.42 
The trust provided that at the decedent’s death the trust assets were to 
be divided into five shares for the wife and children, with the wife’s share to 
be held in a marital deduction trust.43 A schedule of trust assets was at-
tached, but was left blank.44 In 2003, the first trust amendment upped the 
wife’s share from one-fifth to one-half, and added a share for the wife’s 
daughter, who was also made the remainderman of her mother’s marital 
deduction trust.45 A 2004 amendment provided the wife with $5 million of 
the settlor’s FLP interest and eliminated the marital-deduction trust.46 
 
 37. UTC, supra note 1, § 401 cmt. 
 38. Sutter v. Sutter, 345 Ark. 12, 17, 43 S.W.3d 736, 739 (2001). 
 39. Ashley v. Ashley, 2012 Ark. App. 236, at 1–2, 405 S.W.3d 419, 421. 
 40. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 421. 
 41. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 421. 
 42. Id. at 2–3, 405 S.W.3d at 421. 
 43. Id. at 3, 405 S.W.3d at 421. 
 44. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 421. 
 45. Ashley, 2012 Ark. App. 236, at 3, 405 S.W.3d at 421–22. 
 46. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
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After the decedent’s death in 2010, his widow elected to take against 
the will.47 When the personal representatives filed the inventory of the dece-
dent’s probate assets, it listed no real estate or interest in the FLP, and re-
flected a total value of only about $250,000.48 The widow asserted that real 
property valued in excess of $1 million had been left off of the list, as well 
as the interest in the FLP, which she claimed was worth $15 million.49 In 
response, the personal representatives argued that the decedent had trans-
ferred the FLP interest to the trust prior to his death.50 The circuit court held 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent’s interest in 
the FLP had been so transferred.51 
On appeal, the widow argued that no transfer to the trust had occurred 
because the trust schedule was left blank, and that by ruling that a transfer 
had occurred, the trial court was allowing extrinsic evidence to vary the 
terms of the trust.52 However, the trust gave the settlor the power to add or 
remove property from the trust at his discretion, and the court noted he 
could have done so.53 The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that parol evi-
dence of the decedent’s estate planning attorneys was relevant as to the de-
cedent’s intent.54 One attorney testified that a blank schedule of assets was 
not uncommon.55 He acknowledged that there was no document expressly 
transferring the FLP interest into the trust, but the 1997 written estate plan 
and a 2003 exchange of emails both evidenced the settlor’s intent that the 
FLP interest be included in the trust assets.56 
Ashley is two degrees of connection from UTC section 401. Not only 
was the multi-million dollar FLP interest not transferred in a writing, it was 
not even listed on the schedule of trust assets. Best practices would dictate 
not only that valuable assets be titled to the trust, but also that the trust con-
tain clear and easy procedures for removing property, if the settlor has that 
power. 
Ashley concerned the issue of whether property in the hands of the set-
tlor at the time of the creation of the trust was actually transferred into the 
trust. In Cason v. Lambert, one of the issues considered by the court of ap-
peals was whether a home purchased with joint trust assets was itself a trust 
asset.57 The trust was executed and funded in California by two spouses, but 
 
 47. Id. at 4, 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
 48. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
 49. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
 50. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
 51. Ashley, 2012 Ark. App. 236, at 5, 405 S.W.3d at 422. 
 52. Id. at 6, 405 S.W.3d at 423. 
 53. Id. at 9, 405 S.W.3d at 424–25. 
 54. Id. at 10, 405 S.W.3d at 425. 
 55. Id., 405 S.W.3d at 425. 
 56. Id. at 10–11, 405 S.W.3d at 425. 
 57. Cason v. Lambert, 2015 Ark. App. 41, at 7–8, 454 S.W.3d 250, 256. 
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they later moved to Arkansas and purchased a home with trust assets.58 The 
deed conveyed the home to J. Donald Eackles and A. Marie Eackles, with 
no mention of their trust.59 The court held that the home was not a trust as-
set, relying on two points to reach this conclusion: first, a deed to two 
spouses, absent express words of title, conveys a tenancy by the entirety; 
and second, just as in Ashley, the trust gave the settlors the power to with-
draw money from the trust for any reason.60 Thus, when the husband died, 
the widow became the sole owner of the home. 
Contrasting these cases, in Sutter, the court considered the deeds but 
not the actual wording of them, as well as extrinsic evidence of the settlor’s 
intent. In Ashley, there was no written evidence of transfer, only indirect 
evidence comprising an estate plan, emails and testimony of counsel as to 
intent. In Cason, on the other hand, where the question was whether the 
property remained in the trust or had been removed, the court accepted the 
actual wording of the deed as dispositive. Do courts apply a different stand-
ard as to whether property is a trust asset if the property was allegedly trans-
ferred after the creation of the trust, as opposed to whether property was 
transferred to a trust at its creation? In all these cases, intent seems to be the 
most important factor, divined from instruments, writings, and testimony of 
counsel. The moral of these cases, if there is one, is that consistency across 
instruments and correct titling on deeds may keep the trust out of court. 
Best practices require listing the property to be transferred into the trust 
on an attached schedule. Attaching a bill of sale for personal property is 
desirable, as is conveying real property by deed to the trustee, as trustee of 
the named trust.61 If the client insists on making the transfers himself, it is 
wise to obtain a waiver. 
D. Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation—Warning to Drafters 
Cy pres is the common law doctrine that allows courts to change the 
purpose of a charitable devise or trust provision to carry out a transferor’s 
general charitable intent.62 Under the common law, the requirement of “gen-
eral charitable intent” was often a sticking point. Arkansas has recognized 
the cy pres doctrine since at least 1922.63 Under traditional common law cy 
 
 58. Id. at 1, 454 S.W.3d at 252. 
 59. Id. at 7–8, 454 S.W.3d at 256. 
 60. Id., 454 S.W.3d at 256. 
 61. For more information on this see ARK. BAR ASS’N, REVOCABLE TRUST HANDBOOK 
FOR ARKANSAS PRACTITIONERS (2007). 
 62. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431, Westlaw (database up-
dated Sept. 2016). 
 63. See McCarroll v. Grand Lodge, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows, 154 Ark. 376, 243 
S.W. 870 (1922). 
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pres, there must be a gift in trust for a charitable purpose that is impossible 
or impracticable.64 In addition, the settlor must have “general” charitable 
intent65—this is the justification for a court’s power to redirect the gift. If the 
settlor has supplied a valid gift-over, or alternate disposition, then applica-
tion of the cy pres doctrine would not be warranted. 
A recent case in which a trial court used the doctrine, only to be re-
versed on appeal, was Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, which concerned 
the testamentary trust of a decedent that provided equal shares of income 
from farm land to four family members during their lives.66 At the death of 
the last beneficiary, the residue was to be divided between two Osceola 
churches, the First Presbyterian and the First Baptist.67 As family members 
passed away, the trustee began to divide the undistributed income equally 
between the two churches.68 However, in 2004, the Presbyterian church dis-
solved.69 Its assets became the property of Covenant Presbytery, which was 
not an Osceola church.70 First Baptist questioned the distribution to Cove-
nant Presbytery, and the trustee petitioned the circuit court for direction.71 
The court ruled that all income originally destined for First Presbyterian 
should now be paid to First Baptist under the cy pres doctrine.72 The court 
denied First Baptist’s counterclaim against the trustee, and First Baptist ap-
pealed.73 The Court of Appeals of Arkansas reversed and remanded, and 
First Baptist petitioned for review.74 
Although on original appeal the court of appeals held that cy pres did 
not apply because the trust was not completely charitable (because it con-
tained gifts to individuals as well as to the two churches),75 the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas properly did not reject the application of cy pres on that 
ground, noting that under the ATC, a charitable trust is “a trust, or portion of 
 
 64. 14 C.J.S. Charities § 46, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, 2016 Ark. 138, at 1, 489 S.W.3d 153, 155. The 
Court of Appeals of Arkansas originally decided the case, Covenant Presbytery v. First Bap-
tist Church, 2015 Ark. App. 417, 467 S.W.3d 190, but on review the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas vacated the court of appeals decision. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 2, 489 S.W.3d at 
155. 
 67. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 2, 489 S.W.3d at 155. 
 68. Id. at 2–3, 489 S.W.3d at 155–56. 
 69. Id. at 3, 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 70. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 71. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 72. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 73. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 4, 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 74. Id. at 4, 489 S.W.3d at 156. 
 75. Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, 2015 Ark. App. 417, at 8, 467 S.W.3d 
190, 196. 
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a trust, created for a charitable purpose.”76 Instead, however, the supreme 
court focused on “created for a charitable purpose,” and held that cy pres did 
not apply because the testamentary trust did not include a charitable purpose 
in the devises to the two churches.77 Charitable purposes listed in the ATC 
are “the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the 
promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes 
the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.”78 Here, the will 
“neither provided that the devise was to serve a charitable purpose nor re-
stricted the churches from using the farm’s proceeds for noncharitable pur-
poses.”79 Nor did it direct the trustees to ensure that the property would be 
used for a charitable purpose.80 The supreme court relied on its precedent 
from a 1984 case stating that “in creating a charitable trust the settlor must 
describe a purpose of substantial public interest.”81 However, in quoting its 
past precedent, the court ignored other provisions of the ATC. 
The dissent noted that “the advancement of . . . religion” is a charitable 
purpose under the ATC.82 It argued that there is no requirement that a will or 
trust set out a charitable purpose, as long as it is “clear” that the settlor’s 
intent was purposeful.83 And by naming two churches as beneficiaries, the 
devise clearly indicated the purpose of advancing religion.84 The dissent 
further noted ATC section 405(c), which allows a court to select a charitable 
purpose or charitable beneficiary if one is not named.85 
In view of both the law’s encouragement of charities and the wording 
of ATC section 405(c), it would seem that the dissent has the better argu-
ment here. However, the prudent course for drafters will be to insert an ex-
press charitable purpose in a charitable will or trust provision, even if the 
beneficiary is a charitable entity. 
The doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation are closely related. 
Equitable deviation, as codified in the ATC, allows a court to either modify 
a trust with regard to its administrative and dispositive terms or to terminate 
the trust, because of unanticipated circumstances or an inability to adminis-
 
 76. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 6, 489 S.W.3d at 157 (emphasis added); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 28-73-103(4) (Repl. 2012). 
 77. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 7, 489 S.W.3d at 158. 
 78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-405(a) (Repl. 2012). 
 79. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 7, 489 S.W.3d at 158. 
 80. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 158. 
 81. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 158 (quoting Kohn v. Pearson, 282 Ark. 418, 420, 670 S.W.2d 
795, 796 (1984)). 
 82. Id. at 10, 489 S.W.3d at 159 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 
28-73-405(a)). 
 83. Id. at 11, 489 S.W.3d at 160. 
 84. Id., 489 S.W.3d at 160. 
 85. Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 11, 489 S.W.3d at 160; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-
405(c). 
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ter the trust effectively.86 Equitable deviation applies to both charitable and 
private trusts, and so if the trial court had applied it in Covenant Presbytery 
the supreme court would not have been able to reverse on the ground that 
the trust provision did not have a charitable purpose. 
The doctrine of equitable deviation does not appear by that name in any 
Arkansas appellate case law prior to the enactment of the ATC. Since then, 
one trustee has sought to use the doctrine, unsuccessfully, in a Court of Ap-
peals of Arkansas case. In In re Ruby G. Owen Trust ex rel. Owen, the set-
tlor grandmother created a trust for the benefit of her nine grandchildren, 
including a granddaughter, Kristian.87 The trust was discretionary, with both 
income and principal available for distribution, although preservation of 
principal was a priority.88 A year after the trust was created, and a month 
before the death of the settlor, Kristian was diagnosed with schizophrenia.89 
The Arkansas bank serving as trustee petitioned to convert the trust to a 
special-needs trust, so that Kristian, an Alaska resident, could qualify for 
public benefits.90 The trial court ruled that such a conversion of the trust 
would violate Arkansas public policy, citing Arkansas Code Annotated sec-
tions 20-77-101 and 28-69-102, which state the public policy that recipients 
of Medicaid be indigent and not have other means, and prohibit grantors 
from sequestering assets in a trust in order to qualify for medical assis-
tance.91 This ruling did not address several factors: first, Kristian’s grand-
mother, and not Kristian, created the trust, and had the grandmother not died 
she would almost certainly have attempted to modify it;92 second, medical 
assistance in Alaska was the issue, not medical assistance in Arkansas; and 
third, both Arkansas and Congress authorize special-needs trusts. 
 
 86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-412 (Repl. 2012). 
 87. In re Ruby G. Owen Trust ex rel. Owen, 2012 Ark. App. 381, at 1, 418 S.W.3d 421, 
422. 
 88. Id., 418 S.W.3d at 422. 
 89. Id. at 2, 418 S.W.3d at 422. 
 90. Id. at 1, 2, 418 S.W.3d at 422. The terms “special-needs trust” and “supplemental-
needs trust” are sometimes used interchangeably. Such a trust provides a disabled beneficiary 
with comfort and medical support that she would not receive from government assistance. 
Such a trust may not disqualify the beneficiary from Medicaid benefits. Here, I will use the 
term to refer to both self-settled trusts and third-party settled trusts. The requirements for the 
former are stricter; typically any trust assets remaining at the death of the beneficiary must be 
used to reimburse the state. See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, 
ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT ¶ 17.03 (2d ed. 2007). 
 91. Ruby, 2012 Ark. App. 381, at 6–7, 418 S.W.3d at 424. 
 92. If the grandmother had been alive, under the ATC, in a major change from common 
law, if the settlor and all beneficiaries agree, an irrevocable trust can be modified without 
court approval. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-411 (Repl. 2012). Here, the grandchild most likely 
lacked the capacity to agree, although a guardian ad litem could have been appointed to rep-
resent her. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-305 (Repl. 2012). 
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The trustee argued on appeal that the trial court should have exercised 
the equitable deviation power and modified the trust.93 The court disagreed, 
noting several cases in which trusts created for the benefit of disabled bene-
ficiaries with the purpose of providing assistance in addition to medical ben-
efits were held void as against public policy.94 However, these cases in-
volved trusts not subject to the provision covering special-needs trusts.95 
Congress allows the establishment of special-needs trusts by persons other 
than the beneficiary (including courts), authorizes such trusts, and restricts 
states from counting their assets for Medicaid purposes.96 In fact, Arkansas 
even authorizes self-settled special-needs trusts under certain conditions and 
has established a revolving fund for such trusts.97 In its decision, the court 
applied its public policy analysis incorrectly to third-party special-needs 
trusts. 
Do the trustees have another course of action? If Alaska had friendlier 
law,98 the principal place of administration of the trust could perhaps be 
transferred there. The ATC imposes a duty on a trustee to administer the 
trust in a place appropriate to its purposes, administration, and beneficiaries’ 
interests.99 The relevant ATC section presumes the existing trustee or a suc-
cessor trustee will be able to operate in the new jurisdiction, which probably 
would not have been the case here with the existing trustee, as Pine Bluff 
National Bank was the trustee. A trustee may resign and a new trustee ac-
cept without court approval, if the new trustee has the unanimous agreement 
of the qualified beneficiaries, but here the life beneficiary was incapacitated. 
 
 93. Ruby, 2012 Ark. App. 381, at 3, 418 S.W.3d at 422. 
 94. Id. at 7, 418 S.W.3d at 424 (citing Thomas v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 319 Ark. 
782, 894 S.W.2d 584 (1995); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 
S.W.2d 823 (1993)). Thomas involved a third-party trust established for the benefit of an 
injured disabled beneficiary that would not meet today’s requirements for a special-needs 
trust. The trust in Walters was self-settled and also did not meet validity requirements set out 
by the federal law enacted in 1993. These decisions involved trusts that would not be valid 
special-needs trusts today. 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2012). The legislation authorizing special-needs trusts was 
enacted in 1993 as part of an attempt by Congress to close Medicaid loopholes but at the 
same time allow for additional income for disabled persons through the vehicle of special-
needs trusts, so long as they are structured in a particular way. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) is mandatory. Ctr. for 
Special Needs Tr. Admin., Inc. v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 703 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012); see also Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 2008-165, 
discussing how special needs trusts impact eligibility for Medicaid and the UTC’s effect on 
special-needs trusts, and opining that the UTC should have no effect on an otherwise-valid 
third-party settlor special-needs trust. 
 97. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-77-701 to -710 (Repl. 2014). 
 98. It seems that Alaska law is friendlier. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 100.606 
(West 2016). 
 99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-108(b) (Repl. 2012). 
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Another line of argument here might have been that Alaska law should gov-
ern.100 
A recently adopted uniform law would have solved the trustee’s prob-
lem in this case. The Uniform Trust Decanting Act, discussed briefly below,
 
101 allows a fiduciary to “decant” or convert a trust to a special-needs trust if 
the beneficiary is disabled.102 This court decision points out the need for a 
trust decanting statute in Arkansas. 
E. Spendthrift Trust Termination—An Uphill Battle 
Spendthrift provisions are popular additions to trusts, but are not al-
ways viewed fondly by the trust beneficiaries who are limited in their free-
dom to use trust assets. Fern Stafford established a trust that would termi-
nate at Fern’s death.103 Its assets would then be used to form a spendthrift 
trust administered by Arvest Bank for the benefit of Kathy Buckalew, Fern’s 
daughter.104 Buckalew would not receive any trust assets from either princi-
pal or income until she reached the age of sixty unless, in the meantime, she 
suffered a significant medical hardship or disability.105 At age sixty, Buck-
alew would receive a distribution equal to her average earned income for the 
three years prior to her sixtieth birthday, although not less than $50,000 and 
not more than $75,000 annually (and adjusted for inflation).106 At Buck-
alew’s death, the remainder would be paid to the heirs of Fern’s sister-in-
law.107 
At Fern’s death, Buckalew and the heirs agreed on a family settlement 
agreement to terminate the trust.108 Buckalew next petitioned to terminate 
the Fern Trust, relying on a trust termination statute predating the ATC and 
still in force.109 The trustee, Arvest, responded and opposed the termination, 
 
 100. Unless the trust stated otherwise, the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest rela-
tionship to the matter governs. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-107 (Repl. 2012). Here, the trustee 
argued that Alaska law should apply. Unfortunately, the argument was made for the first time 
on appeal, so it went unaddressed. In re Ruby G. Owen Trust ex rel. Owen, 2012 Ark. App. 
381, at 4 n.1, 418 S.W.3d at 423. 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 453–57. 
 102. UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 13 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trustdecanting/UTDA_Final%20Act.pdf. 
 103. Buckalew v. Arvest Trust Co., 2013 Ark. App. 28, at 2, 425 S.W.3d 819, 821. 
 104. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 821. 
 105. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 821. 
 106. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 821. 
 107. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 821. 
 108. Id. at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 821. 
 109. Buckalew, 2013 Ark. App. 28, at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 821; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-
401 (Repl. 2012). 
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citing the ATC modification and termination statute.110 This statute codifies 
the common law “Claflin doctrine,” that if a settlor has died or does not 
agree, a trust may be modified or terminated only if: (i) all beneficiaries 
agree, and (ii) the modification or termination would not defeat a material 
purpose of the trust.111 The original UTC stated that a spendthrift clause was 
not presumed to be a material purpose of a trust.112 The Arkansas enactment 
is the opposite—a spendthrift provision is presumed to be a material pur-
pose.113 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-69-401, the statute on which 
Buckalew relied, conflicts to some extent with the corresponding ATC pro-
vision. The former states that if a settlor is deceased and a trust’s purposes 
are not being fulfilled or are frustrated by unanticipated circumstances, a 
court can terminate a trust if the court finds there is “general family benefit” 
to the beneficiaries and their families, and either the settlor’s personal repre-
sentative can consent or acquiesce, or a court can consent standing in the 
shoes of the settlor’s estate.114 This statute expressly states that modification 
or termination may be had regardless of a spendthrift provision.115 In other 
words, it is a less strong statement of the Claflin doctrine and not as support-
ive of spendthrift trusts. 
The circuit court found that Buckalew had not presented evidence 
proving changed circumstances or frustration of the trust’s purposes.116 On 
appeal, Buckalew argued that the court erred by (1) applying the ATC modi-
fication/termination provision, (2) finding no change in circumstances, (3) 
finding no rebuttal of the presumption that the spendthrift clause was a ma-
terial purpose, and (4) refusing to terminate the trust.117 The court dodged 
the question of which statute should apply and noted that the court below 
ruled that Buckalew was not successful by the measure of either.118 It noted 
that neither statute purports to be exclusive, and they overlap to a large ex-
tent.119 
The evidence of changed circumstances was that Buckalew stated that 
she provided for Fern’s care, which interfered with Buckalew’s employ-
 
 110. Buckalew, 2013 Ark. App. 28, at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 821; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-
411 (Repl. 2012). 
 111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-411; UTC, supra note 1, § 411 cmt. 
 112. UTC, supra note 1, § 411. 
 113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-411. Arkansas is not the only state that changed the UTC 
in this way. Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota made the same modification. See, e.g., 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38-411 (West 2016). 
 114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-401. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Buckalew v. Arvest Trust Co., 2013 Ark. App. 28, at 3–4, 425 S.W.3d 819, 821–22. 
 117. Id. at 4, 425 S.W.3d at 822. 
 118. Id. at 6, 425 S.W.3d at 823. 
 119. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 823. 
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ment, and in turn limited the return she would receive from the trust.120 The 
court was not sympathetic, noting that this development and the possibility 
of inadequate distribution levels, were not unforeseen while the settlor was 
still alive.121 
The continued existence of Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-69-
401 leads to confusion and “statute-shopping” by plaintiffs seeking to modi-
fy or terminate a trust. It was not repealed when the ATC was enacted. It 
should be. 
One way that the ATC has rendered trustees’ work easier is by provid-
ing many tools with which to modify or terminate trusts.122 The ATC allows 
a court to reform the terms of a trust if there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of a mistake by the settlor, either of law or fact, and whether in ex-
pression or in inducement.123 This provision of the ATC was intended to 
mirror a corresponding Restatement section that changes the common law 
rule and allows reformation of wills when there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of mistake.124 It was applied successfully in Anthony v. Turner.125 In 
this case, Susan Anthony, a trustee and beneficiary of the Wirth Living 
Trust, appealed from a trial court ruling denying her complaint for refor-
mation of the trust.126 Anthony alleged that Wirth’s attorney had drafted a 
codicil to Wirth’s will rather than an amendment to her trust, as Wirth had 
intended.127 The trust amendment would have given Wirth sole discretion 
over all of the trust property, rather than having to distribute some of it to 
another beneficiary.128 In support of her argument Anthony offered her tes-
timony and a letter from Wirth that indicated Wirth wanted Anthony to have 
everything except for two small bequests.129 
The attorney for Wirth testified that Wirth sent a letter, delivered by 
Anthony, directing him to draft a codicil to her will rather than an amend-
ment to her trust, that he did so, and that Wirth was satisfied.130 He testified 
 
 120. Id. at 7, 425 S.W.3d at 823. 
 121. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 823. 
 122. See Beth A. Wood, Making Misfit Trusts Work When Planning Goes Awry, PROB. & 
PROP., Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 55, for a helpful discussion of Article 4 of the UTC, particularly 
reformation under UTC § 415 and modification to accomplish tax objectives under UTC § 
416. 
 123. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-415 (Repl. 2012). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
 125. Anthony v. Turner, CA 08-427, 2008 WL 4735903 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008). 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
316 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
that Wirth was aware of what property of hers was passing via the will as 
opposed to the trust, and that she knew what she was doing.131 
The trial court did not think the evidence justified applying Arkansas 
Code Annotated 28-73-415 and reforming the trust, and granted the appel-
lees’ motion to dismiss.132 However, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Anthony, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that Anthony’s 
testimony and Wirth’s typewritten pages made a prima facie case that the 
settlor’s intent and trust terms were affected by a mistake of fact.133 The case 
was remanded for determination on the merits.134 
A second attempt to reform a trust using the same ATC section was 
shot down by the court of appeals in 2012. In Eft v. Rogers, a joint revocable 
trust of a husband and wife provided that on the death of the surviving set-
tlor, their son John would become the successor trustee.135 He would distrib-
ute $10,000 to his cousin and the remainder would go to John or his issue.136 
After the husband died, John died as well.137 His mother, Mary Jane, amend-
ed the trust several times, at first making John’s widow a co-trustee and ex-
ecutor and leaving the trust residue to her.138 By the time of Mary Jane’s 
death, she had appointed or nominated her niece to be the successor trustee, 
agent under a power of attorney, and executor of her estate.139 And although 
Mary Jane had removed her daughter-in-law from all fiduciary roles, she 
nonetheless left the residue of her estate to her.140 
The niece sought reformation of the trust.141 As evidence, she intro-
duced hearsay testimony of a housekeeper and hairdresser as to the intent of 
Mary Jane to change the disposition of the residue.142 On the other hand, the 
drafting attorney testified that at no time did Mary Jane communicate any 
such intent to him—she wanted the daughter-in-law removed from fiduciary 
positions but indicated no intent to remove her as a beneficiary.143 Noting 
the clear and convincing standard required by Arkansas Code Annotated 
section 28-73-415, the court agreed with the circuit court that the high 
standard had not been met by the evidence.144 
 
 131. Anthony, 2008 WL 4735903, at *2. 
 132. Id. at *3. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Eft v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. App. 632, at 1–2, 425 S.W.3d 1, 2. 
 136. Id. at 2, 425 S.W.3d at 2. 
 137. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 2. 
 138. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 2. 
 139. Id. at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 3. 
 140. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 3. 
 141. Eft, 2012 Ark. App. 632, at 4, 425 S.W.3d at 3. 
 142. Id. at 7–8, 425 S.W.3d at 5. 
 143. Id. at 11, 425 S.W.3d at 7. 
 144. Id. at 12–13, 425 S.W.3d at 8. 
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An attorney for the appellant testified as an expert witness as to some 
best practices for estate planners: taking and keeping notes of discussions 
with clients; transmitting documents accompanied by letters of explanation; 
and following up with discussion between the transmission of drafts and the 
execution.145 Some additional suggestions from a recent article on estate 
planning include the following practices. First, keeping a diary system will 
ensure that communications with clients are frequent and timely. Second, 
standard operating procedures that include documenting, dating, and some-
times even including witnesses to recommendations to a client, and includ-
ing the reasoning behind the plans and specific mechanisms, can minimize 
exposure to malpractice and professional responsibility claims. Finally, a 
memo in the client file summarizing why a client has disregarded planning 
advice can also minimize exposure.146 
F. Creditors’ and Surviving Spouses’ Rights 
Subchapter Five of the ATC deals with creditors’ claims. Arkansas 
made several significant changes to this subchapter during enactment. First, 
it omitted Section 503, which removed alimony, child support, and attor-
ney’s liens from being subject to spendthrift provisions. Second, it omitted 
Section 505(a)(3), which allows creditors of a deceased settlor to attach rev-
ocable trust assets if probate assets are insufficient. The rest of the subchap-
ter was enacted, and in 2015 Section 505 was amended to further limit 
creditors’ access to trust assets. The amendments are discussed below, pre-
ceded by cases dealing with creditors’ rights of attachment and spendthrift 
trusts. 
Section 501 is the first of six sections of the ATC that deal with credi-
tors’ rights.147 It states generally that “a court may authorize a creditor or 
assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s interest by attachment 
of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary or 
other means.”148 The comment qualifies the statute by explaining that some 
beneficiaries’ interests may be “too indefinite or contingent for the creditor 
to reach . . . .”149 Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-501 was an issue 
 
 145. Id. at 11–12, 425 S.W. at 7. 
 146. Lauren Rocklin, How Estate Planners Can Avoid Malpractice Claims, 39 EST. 
PLAN., Jul. 2012, at 26, 29. 
 147. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-501 to -507 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2015). Arkansas did not 
enact section 503, which allows the following claims as exceptions to a spendthrift provision 
in a trust: a child for child support; a spouse or ex-spouse for maintenance; an attorney judg-
ment creditor who has protected the beneficiary’s trust interest; and a claim of Arkansas or 
the United States. See UTC, supra note 1, § 503. 
 148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-501. 
 149. UTC, supra note 1, § 501 cmt. 
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in J.B. Hunt, LLC v. Thornton.150 In this case, debtors Robert and Frieda 
Thornton were the trustees and life beneficiaries of five charitable remainder 
trusts.151 The trusts provided for the Thorntons to receive quarterly annuity 
distributions from the trusts until their deaths.152 J.B. Hunt, apparently the 
last in a line of multiple creditors that had already received judgments 
against the Thorntons, sought to jump to the head of the line by filing a 
“creditors’ bill,” under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-66-418 that 
would enable it to create an equitable lien against the trusts.153 It argued that 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-501 permits attachment of present 
or future distributions if authorized by a court, and Arkansas Code Annotat-
ed section 16-66-418 was an “appropriate mechanism” for obtaining at-
tachment.154 
J.B. Hunt had won a $12.7 million judgment against the Thorntons.155 
Its attachment action under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-66-418 
was consolidated by the Benton County Circuit Court with a case already 
pending involving other judgment creditors and the priority of their 
claims.156 In a subsequent letter opinion, the circuit court explained that var-
ious creditors had competed in a “race to serve,” obtaining writs of garnish-
ment on the trustees.157 The court stated that their respective garnishments 
had been determined by “winning the race.”158 It dismissed J.B. Hunt’s at-
tempt to attach the trust assets.159 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
agreed with the trial court.160 It characterized the Thorntons’ life interest in 
annuities as “contingent” on their survival and, relying on Thompson v. 
Bank of America, cited its past precedent that payment contingent on an 
individual’s survival is not certain (or “vested”) until a payment becomes 
due.161 The court reviewed its case law, although not citing any cases in sup-
port of its position, and stated that an action under Arkansas Code Annotat-
ed section 16-66-418(a) is not the “typical procedure” used by judgment 
creditors.162 The court noted that the creditors’ bill only works if a beneficial 
 
 150. 2014 Ark. 62, 432 S.W.3d 8. 
 151. Id. at 2, 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 152. Id., 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 153. Id., 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 154. Id. at 5, 432 S.W.3d at 11. 
 155. Id. at 2, 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 156. Thornton, 2014 Ark. 62, at 3, 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 157. Id., 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 158. Id., 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 159. Id. at 4, 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 160. Id. at 2, 432 S.W.3d at 10. 
 161. Id. at 7, 432 S.W.3d at 12. 
 162. Thornton, 2014 Ark. 62, at 8, 432 S.W.3d at 13. 
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interest cannot be reached by regular process of law.163 Here, the interest 
could be reached, as each payment came due. 
It is difficult to comment on this opinion because so many questions 
are unanswered. First, what kind of trusts were these? Robert Thornton was 
a former WalMart executive who participated in real estate development and 
airline schemes that went bust.164 Was the establishment of the trusts a 
fraudulent transfer? If so, then they could be set aside.165 If not, these were 
presumably self-settled trusts, in which case, creditors would have the right 
to reach whatever assets the settlor-beneficiaries could.166 All of the five 
trusts were charitable remainder trusts, so presumably they were irrevocable 
and the Thorntons had no right to invade the principal. 
The UTC is slightly less protective of debtors than is the ATC, alt-
hough neither allows debtors to shield assets through the creation of “asset 
protection trusts”—self-settled trusts that are formed by settlors with their 
own protection from creditors being a foremost concern.167 Section 505 of 
the UTC gives creditors access to both all of the trust assets of a self-settled 
revocable trust, and the maximum assets of an irrevocable trust that can be 
distributed to a settlor-beneficiary under any conditions.168 If the Thornton 
trusts were self-settled and the Thorntons could have access to more than 
their quarterly annuity under any circumstances, however farfetched, the 
creditors would have access to them as well. 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-505 figured in a federal bank-
ruptcy case in 2011. It is settled law that spendthrift trusts benefitting debt-
ors are not counted as part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.169 A variation 
on this fact pattern occurred in Wetzel v. Regions Bank, where a husband’s 
will created a testamentary trust for his wife, who also served as the execu-
 
 163. Id. at 10, 432 S.W.3d at 14. 
 164. See Former Partners Foreclose on Schwyhart’s Home, NORTHWEST ARKANSAS 
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, May 7, 2011, http://www.nwaonline.com/news/2011/may/07/former-
partners-foreclose-schwyharts-home/; Worth Sparkman, 7 Bill Schwyhart Compnaies File 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, ARKANSAS BUSINESS, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.arkansasbusiness.co 
m/article/37111/7-bill-schwyhart-companies-file-chapter-11-bankruptcy?page=all; see also 
Schwyhart v. J.B. Hunt, LLC, 2014 Ark. App. 324, 436 S.W.3d 173; Pinnacle Point Props., 
LLC v. Metro. Nat’l Bank, 2012 Ark. App. 268, 2012 WL 1328995; Ctr. Capital Corp. v. JR 
Lear 60-099, LLC, C.A. No. 08–508–LPS–MPT, 2010 WL 3719062 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2010) 
(adopting report of magistrate in Ctr. Capital Corp. v. JR Lear 60-099, LLC, C.A. No. 08–
508–JJF–MPT, 2010 WL 3000188 (D. Del. June 23, 2010)). 
 165. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204 (Repl. 2011). 
 166. Id. § 28-73-505 (Supp. 2015). 
 167. Asset protection trusts arose in other countries, some of which are traditionally re-
garded as tax havens, like the Bahamas, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands. At this time, 
sixteen states have enacted domestic asset protection trust legislation. See generally JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 703 (9th ed. 2013). 
 168. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505. 
 169. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012). 
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tor.170 The will directed her to fund the trust with stock.171 Regions was to be 
the trustee.172 At the husband’s death, his estate was valued at $20 million.173 
The widow, Cheryl, did not fund the trust; instead she used proceeds from 
the sale of the stock to “finance a series of unsuccessful business ven-
tures.”174 
More than four years after the husband’s death, one of his sons filed a 
petition and the circuit court froze the remaining estate assets (now greatly 
reduced).175 The widow filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy.176 The court 
removed her as executor.177 It ordered the new personal representative to 
fund the trust, which the court ruled contained a spendthrift provision, with 
an initial amount of $2.4 million and appointed Regions the trustee.178 As 
the new trust began to generate income, Regions asked whether the widow 
or the bankruptcy trustee should get the income.179 The personal representa-
tive, a creditor of the estate, intervened and argued for a third alternative, 
that a claim assigned to him should be collected from the trust distribu-
tions.180 
The personal representative and bankruptcy trustee argued that the 
widow’s behavior made the spendthrift clause unenforceable.181 The bank-
ruptcy court disagreed, ruling that the property was to be distributed to 
Cheryl and that it was not part of the bankruptcy estate.182 On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the bank-
ruptcy court.183 
Appellants argued that Hartsfield v. Lescher was controlling.184 In 
Hartsfield, a spendthrift trust created by a father for his sons contained a 
provision allowing the sons to extend the lifetime of the trust.185 One of the 
beneficiaries owed forty percent of any inheritance or similar property for 
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his children’s support under the terms of his divorce decree.186 He and his 
brother extended the trust termination date “for an indefinite period of time” 
to be determined by them.187 The court found that this gave the beneficiaries 
the benefit of the spendthrift provision but control over trust assets, as they 
controlled the termination date.188 The court allowed the trust to stand, but 
minus the spendthrift provision.189 
In Wetzel, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Hartsfield because in that 
case the beneficiary of the spendthrift trust had the power to revise the terms 
of the trust.190 Here, Cheryl had no such power; thus, Hartsfield did not ap-
ply.191 Appellants then argued that as executor she exercised power over the 
assets before they were transferred into the trust.192 Because this power was 
in her capacity as executor and not as beneficiary, the court was unpersuad-
ed.193 The appellants also argued that Cheryl invalidated the spendthrift trust 
when she acted as executor and improperly handled assets earmarked for the 
trust.194 The court noted that because she acted improperly while an executor 
and not as a beneficiary, her conduct did not violate the spendthrift provi-
sion.195 The appellants also made an estoppel in pais argument,196 which the 
court rejected, finding no reliance.197 
On the second issue, the appellants argued that because Arkansas al-
lows a creditor to execute on income from a spendthrift trust the moment the 
income reaches the beneficiary’s hands, the same right exists in bankrupt-
cy.198 The Eighth Circuit clarified the bankruptcy court’s conclusion, which 
was simply that the spendthrift trust income was not part of the bankruptcy 
estate, whether in the hands of the trustee or of the beneficiary.199 The 
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court’s holding did not limit rights outside of bankruptcy that might permit 
attachment of the distributions.200 
The same section of the ATC cited in Wetzel was amended by the Ar-
kansas legislature in 2015, marking the only major amendment to the ATC 
since its adoption in 2005,201 and expanding the situations in which protec-
tion from creditors applies. First, if a trust has more than one settlor, the 
amendment allows creditors of one settlor access only to the assets attribut-
able to that settlor.202 Second, if a person (such as a settlor or beneficiary) 
holds a power of withdrawal, the ATC treats that person as a settlor with 
respect to a creditor’s claim.203 As amended, the ATC now states that on the 
lapse, release, or waiver of such a power, the holder of a power is not treated 
as a settlor.204 In addition, property transferred to one of the following is not 
deemed to be property of a settlor: (1) an irrevocable qualified terminable 
interest property (QTIP) trust (under § 2523(f) of the Internal Revenue 
Code), if the settlor is a beneficiary after the death of the settlor’s spouse; 
(2) an irrevocable general power of appointment trust (under § 2523(e) of 
the Internal Revenue Code), if the settlor is a beneficiary after the death of 
the settlor’s spouse; or (3) an irrevocable trust for the benefit of a person, to 
the extent that the property of the trust was subject to a general power of 
appointment in another person.205 This amendment will weaken creditors’ 
rights against settlors’ assets typically distributed to a surviving spouse and 
descendants.206 
G. Evil Stepmoms? Revocation and Amendment by the Surviving Spouse 
Joint revocable trusts, in which a husband and wife typically serve as 
co-trustees, are common estate planning tools. Issues often arise as to the 
power of the surviving spouse (usually the wife) over trust assets. Can she 
revoke or amend the trust? When the surviving spouse is a second spouse 
and the remainder beneficiaries are children from a first or multiple former 
marriages, the probability of a dispute increases. Other than attorney’s fees, 
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this has been the most-litigated trust question in Arkansas, in terms of appel-
late decisions, since the enactment of the UTC. 
In Holbrook v. Freeman, a husband and wife created a joint revocable 
trust, naming a daughter as the trustee but later transferring the trusteeship to 
themselves.207 The trust provisions called for the trust to terminate after the 
death of both spouses and the remainder to be distributed mostly to their 
children.208 However, after the husband died the widow revoked the termina-
tion provision of the trust, remarried and later allegedly informed her chil-
dren that she was retitling the trust property and spending it herself.209 The 
trust instrument stated “[s]ettlors specifically reserve the right and power to 
alter, delete, modify, change and/or revoke any paragraph of this Trust 
Agreement and all provisions thereof at any time; provided, however, that 
this right is personal to Settlor and may not be exercised by a personal rep-
resentative.”210 
One of the children sued for a temporary restraining order and an ac-
counting, arguing that, among other things, because “settlor” was singular 
rather than plural the widow did not have the right to revoke after her hus-
band’s death.211 The court disagreed, finding no restrictions on revocation.212 
The child next argued that the ATC limits revocation by one settlor to apply 
only to the property that settlor contributed to the trust.213 The court noted 
that the trust property seemed to be all tenancy by the entirety, and thus 
owned by the widow.214 
Holbrook points out the futility of a beneficiary suing the trustee or set-
tlor of a revocable trust while it is revocable. The ATC states that while a 
trust is revocable and the settlor has the capacity to revoke, “rights of the 
beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are 
owed exclusively to, the settlor.”215 Non-settlor beneficiaries have no en-
forceable rights because of a settlor’s ability to revoke the trust. 
In Jaynes v. Citizens Bank of Batesville, two settlors created a joint 
revocable trust of which they were co-trustees.216 The trust stated that 
“[e]ither Grantor may, from time to time, may [sic] revoke or amend this 
instrument, in whole or in part, but only by an instrument in writing ̔other 
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than a Will ̕signed and delivered to the trustee during the lives of the Gran-
tors.”217 After the first settlor died, the second amended the trust and added a 
second remainder beneficiary.218 The first remainder beneficiary sued, argu-
ing that the trust could not be amended after the death of the first settlor.219 
The court disagreed. It first noted that use of singular and plural forms 
varied throughout the trust.220 The trust clearly authorized the surviving set-
tlor to act as trustee and granted successor trustees all powers of the original 
trustee.221 Because there was no express wording prohibiting the surviving 
trustee from amending the trust, the court interpreted the trust to allow 
amendment.222 Although the court did not cite the ATC in its opinion, the 
ATC makes silent trusts revocable by default.223 
In 2013 and 2014 two cases were decided illustrating some of the 
“down sides” of joint revocable trusts and outcomes that the settlors who die 
first perhaps do not anticipate. In Hartsfield v. Blann, the settlors of the joint 
trust originally left the remainder to Robert Blann’s three children and 
Robena Blann’s three nieces.224 After Robert died, Robena amended the 
trust to remove her husband’s children as beneficiaries, effectively disinher-
iting them.225 After Robena died the children sued to set aside the amend-
ment.226 The circuit court so ordered, and Robena’s nieces appealed.227
 The trust paragraph at issue stated: “REVOCABILITY: The Do-
nors, Robert F. Blann and Robena P. Blann, may, by signed instruments 
delivered to the Trustee during the Donors’ life: . . . (3) change the benefi-
ciaries, their respective shares and the plan of distribution . . . . “228 The cir-
cuit court found this paragraph to be ambiguous, but the Court of Appeals of 
Arkansas disagreed.229 It ruled that the relevant trust provisions could only 
be amended or revoked while both settlors were alive, bolstering its decision 
with authority from other states.230 
On the other hand, the opposite outcome was reached in Erwin v. 
Frost.231 In this case, Donald had three daughters from a previous marriage, 
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and Shelby and Donald had one child of their marriage.232 Although Donald 
allegedly led his daughters to believe he had a will and would be taking care 
of them at his death, instead he and Shelby created a joint revocable trust 
less than a year before his death, after he had begun chemotherapy treat-
ments.233 Four months after Donald’s death, Shelby amended the trust and 
effectively disinherited her three stepdaughters, explaining on the witness 
stand that the daughters were asking about the disposition of certain items in 
the house and the disposition of Donald’s estate.234 She testified that some of 
her personal files had been gone through and that one daughter (an account-
ant and financial analyst) had inquired at the bank about beneficiaries on 
Donald’s accounts.235 She testified that Donald had told her (Shelby) that “if 
the girls did not treat me right to cut them loose.”236 
What child would not wonder what would happen to her father’s estate, 
having been told that there was a will and he would take care of her? No one 
testified that the daughters had been informed of the existence of the trust. 
The daughter who sued alleged lack of capacity and undue influence, but the 
trial court found the evidence insufficient. Testimony at trial was conflicting 
but more witnesses seemed to testify for the daughters than against them. On 
appeal the court of appeals affirmed.237 
These cases illustrate that wording precise enough to carry out the set-
tlors’ intent is essential. Settlors should be interviewed at the time of draft-
ing to make sure they understand the implications either way—whether the 
surviving spouse will have the unlimited power to amend or revoke, or will 
not have the power, or will have something in between. Parties should also 
discuss whether to share the trust with their children, especially if one or 
more children will be successor trustees or co-trustees after the death of the 
first parent. In blended family or stepchildren situations, perhaps spouses 
should be advised to execute separate trusts. If not, it may be advisable to 
insert a provision that the beneficiary designations will become irrevocable 
after the death of the first spouse. On the other hand, drafters should also be 
aware that if a joint trust becomes irrevocable after the death of the first 
spouse there can be unexpected tax implications, as remainder interests may 
become taxable. 
With more and more individuals serving as trustees in situations with 
inherent conflicts of interest, courts will be faced with an increasing number 
of cases in which they will have to decide whether conduct constitutes 
breach of trust. A recent case involving peculiar and inconsistent analysis is 
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Rose v. Rose.238 In this case, in 1994 Woody and Ruth Rose created a joint 
revocable trust whose only asset was their home.239 The trust provided it 
would become irrevocable after the death of the first settlor.240 At the death 
of the surviving spouse, the home was to be sold and the assets distributed 
three-fifths to Woody’s three children and two-fifths to Rose’s two chil-
dren.241 If, however, the surviving spouse did not wish to live in the home, it 
could be sold and the proceeds distributed one-fifth to each child of the de-
ceased settlor and the remainder to the surviving settlor.242 The trust did not 
address carrying costs of the residence.243 An attorney, Thomas Stone, was 
appointed trustee, and a second attorney as successor trustee.244 
Over the next eleven years, the Roses purchased several homes, each 
subject to a mortgage.245 Although the mortgages were conveyed by the 
Roses individually, the residences were conveyed to the trust.246 Until 2003, 
Thomas Stone was identified as the grantee trustee.247 Beginning with the 
penultimate purchase in 2005, the deed identified Woody and Ruth as the 
trustees, although no one notified Thomas Stone that he was no longer the 
trustee.248 
Woody died in 2007 and afterward Ruth conveyed the home first to 
herself as an individual, and then to a third party for consideration of 
$310,000, depositing the money in her personal checking account.249 
Woody’s children sued, alleging that the trust was not revoked and the at-
torney was still the trustee.250 They alleged that Ruth failed to keep trust 
funds separate from her own and to report to them after Woody’s death in 
compliance with the ATC.251 They also argued that she could not convey the 
home to herself as an individual. They sought an injunction and damages, 
and imposition of a constructive trust.252 
Ruth contended the trust had been amended by handwritten notes and 
strikethroughs.253 The trial court found that the amendments were invalid, 
 
 238. Rose v. Rose, 2013 Ark. App. 256, 427 S.W.3d 698. 
 239. Id. at 1, 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 240. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 241. Id. at 2, 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 242. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 243. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 244. Rose, 2013 Ark. App. 256, at 2, 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 245. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 246. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 247. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 248. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 700. 
 249. Id. at 2–3, 427 S.W.3d at 701. 
 250. Rose, 2013 Ark. App. 256, at 3, 427 S.W.3d at 701. 
 251. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 701. 
 252. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 701. 
 253. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 701. 
2016] ARKANSAS'S TRUST CODE AND TRUST PLANNING 327 
that Ruth had incurred $78,000 worth of expenses reimbursable from the 
trust, and that each of the children was entitled to $30,000 from the sale.254 
On appeal, the court of appeals declared that Woody and Ruth were “de 
facto” trustees, introducing a new doctrine to Arkansas case law.255 Alt-
hough it decided that Ruth was a trustee, it contradictorily held that she did 
not breach the trust, even though her acts violated several ATC provisions. 
The ATC section allows trustees to resign or to be removed, but here 
the original, independent trustee did not resign and was never notified that 
he had been removed, which must be ordered by a court.256 The comment to 
the relevant section makes clear that while a trust is revocable, the rights of 
the beneficiaries are subject to the settlor’s absolute control, and that the 
terms of the trust may regulate removal.257 Here, Ruth testified that she and 
Woody simply decided they were going to become the trustees.258 The ma-
jority seems to find that this would be accomplished by a modification of the 
trust.259 The ATC provides that a settlor can modify a trust according to its 
terms (the Rose opinion does not include the relevant trust terms) or, if the 
terms of the trust do not provide a method or if the method provided is not 
exclusive, by another method that manifests clear and convincing evidence 
of the settlor’s intent.260 As the dissent noted, the circuit court made no find-
ing that Ruth was a trustee. There was no clear and convincing evidence of 
modification here. 
As regards de facto trustees, the UTC does not mention them. The Rose 
majority cites one federal and five state cases in support of the doctrine. On 
examination of these decisions, the facts are significantly different and do 
not support the argument that Woody and Ruth were de facto trustees. In all 
of the cases, the de facto trustees were either (defectively) appointed trustees 
or volunteered in the absence of a trustee.261      
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The first element necessary for a ruling that a de facto trusteeship exists 
is that the person has assumed the office of trustee under color of right or 
title.262 “Color of right or title” means “an authority that was derived from an 
election or appointment, no matter how irregular the election or appointment 
might be.”263 Here, viewing the evidence and decision most favorably to-
ward Ruth, she and Woody decided that they would be co-trustees. They 
marked up the trust (the decision does not tell us how), but the children al-
leged that the markups did not qualify as modifications under the terms of 
the trust. Ruth and Woody did not notify the trustee of their decision. The 
trial court did not make an express finding that Ruth became a trustee, but 
later implied that she was when it ordered her to be reimbursed for her ex-
penses.264 A decision by settlors that they want to be co-trustees, marking up 
the trust in some way that does not conform to its terms, and not notifying 
the current trustee of his removal, does not constitute color of right or title. 
The second element of a de facto trusteeship is “exercising the duties of 
the office.”265 This is exactly what Ruth did not do. She breached the trust in 
multiple ways, by commingling the sale proceeds with her own funds,266 by 
not distributing the proceeds to the children,267 and by not reporting to 
them.268 The conduct of the trustee in this case is closer to that of a trustee 
de son tort—a person not the trustee who has nonetheless exercised control 
and may be liable as a constructive trustee269—than a de facto trustee. In 
fairness, it may be that Ruth never really understood what conduct her trus-
teeship of an irrevocable trust would require. She might have been more 
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successful (at retaining the proceeds) by arguing that she and her husband 
decided to revoke the trust before his death. 
This case points out in particular the need to instruct clients on how 
creating a revocable trust changes how they own their property. They are 
entering into a new legal relationship with their spouse, their property, and 
the beneficiaries. Typically, they now own the property as trustees and life 
beneficiaries, and have fewer rights, especially if a joint trust becomes ir-
revocable after the death of the first spouse. In Rose, the settlors did not 
even convey to themselves as co-trustees, they appointed an independent 
trustee, which caused them trouble as time went on. Cases where settlors 
and settlor-trustees act inappropriately are increasing in number as the num-
ber of revocable trusts continues to grow. 
H. How Should a Nominated Trustee Decline? Very Carefully 
In re Hamilton Living Trust illustrates the potential liability for custo-
dial banks who are designated trustees but decline the trusteeship.270 The 
Hamiltons created a revocable trust.271 Some of their assets were on deposit 
with the Bank of the Ozarks (Bank).272 The trust provided that when the first 
spouse died, the Bank would become a co-trustee with the survivor.273 When 
both died, the Bank would serve as the successor trustee.274 The first element 
of the plan that went awry was when Susan Cossey, the Hamiltons’ daugh-
ter, requested the Bank to provide an accounting of the trust and the Bank 
responded that it had never served as co-trustee or trustee.275 The daughter 
eventually sued, and at a subsequent hearing, the president of the trust de-
partment testified and produced six letters sent between 2009 and 2011, 
each one containing the Bank’s refusal to serve as successor trustee.276 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled in favor of the 
Hamiltons’ daughter for several reasons.277 The court agreed with the Bank 
that it rejected the trusteeship when it sent Larry, the Hamiltons’ son, six 
letters within a year’s time declining to serve.278 Yet the funds remained in 
the Bank, and the Bank did three things.279 First, it reimbursed Larry, whom 
it characterized as the personal representative even though no probate estate 
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was ever opened, for utility and auto expenses.280 In doing so, it did not in-
quire as to whether the home or auto were trust assets (the court thought 
they were not).281 Second, it reimbursed Larry for funeral expenses, thereby 
complying with trust provisions to distribute funds to the personal repre-
sentative, and to pay for funeral expenses.282 Third, it liquidated securities at 
his direction, “another clear function of a trustee.”283 
The Bank argued these acts fell within the ATC provision that allows a 
person rejecting a trusteeship to act to preserve the trust property, as long as 
the person sends a rejection to a qualified beneficiary after taking such ac-
tion.284 The court disagreed because first, there was no evidence that the 
property the Bank acted to preserve was actually trust property.285 Second, 
the reimbursement for funeral expenses and liquidation of securities at the 
direction of a beneficiary went beyond preservation of trust property, and 
thus was not protected by the “safe harbor” provision.286 Instead, the Bank 
“exercised powers or performed trustees’ duties,” and thereby accepted the 
trusteeship.287 Thus, it owed Susan Cossey an accounting. Commenting on 
this decision in the Arkansas Probate and Trust Law Review, a trust officer 
wondered whether if the Bank had been an individual trustee the court 
would have held it to this standard.288 
I. Duty and Breach  
The duty of loyalty—the duty not to self-deal—is perhaps the most 
“fundamental” of a trustee’s duties.289 A very recent Court of Appeals of 
Arkansas decision sheds light on how this duty applies to family members 
who are co-trustees. In Pulliam v. Murphy, a couple created a joint revoca-
ble trust which became irrevocable at their deaths.290 Four of their children 
were successor co-trustees of the trust whose assets included over a thou-
sand acres of farmland.291 Before the parents died, they sold 1.5 acres to a 
son, Carter, who also leased other farm acreage.292 The trust offered the 
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same “privilege” of purchase to any of the other children, for the same con-
sideration.293 Rikka, a daughter and co-trustee, wished to buy 1.5 acres on 
the highway, but Carter, also a co-trustee, objected because he used the area 
to park equipment and provide access to grain silos on his adjacent 1.5 
acres.294 Rikka and another brother voted for the sale to her, but the other 
two siblings voted against the sale, resulting in an unfavorable vote because 
the trust required a majority vote for actions.295 After the winning co-trustees 
sent Rikka a letter containing their reasons for opposing the sale, she sued.296 
The co-trustees maintained that they were administering the trust according 
to its terms.297 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
denial, finding that no beneficiary was entitled to purchase a particular tract 
of land, and that if Rikka wanted a tract she would have to select one that 
the co-trustees agreed to sell to her.298 
The court of appeals disagreed. It found that the plain meaning of the 
trust required the trustees to allow Rikka to purchase 1.5 acres, and that 
Rikka presented material issues of fact by arguing in relevant part that her 
brother’s conflict of interest affected his vote.299 The court cited the ATC 
provision rendering the sale or management of trust property voidable by a 
beneficiary if it is entered into for the trustee’s own account or otherwise 
affected by a conflict.300 Seemingly, this would apply to the requested sale to 
Rikka. However, the court noted a relevant exception—if the trust expressly 
allows such sales.301 The general rule is that a trustee has a duty to act solely 
for the benefit of the trust and not to act in his own interest by participating 
in a transaction relating to the trust if his interest is adverse to the benefi-
ciary.302 The court noted a limitation on this rule, however, that “coinci-
dental benefits” to a trustee-beneficiary resulting from the dual status are not 
enough to establish a breach of fiduciary duty.303 On remand, the trial court 
would have to review the trustees’ actions in light of the ATC and case law 
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 300. Id. at 6, 485 S.W.3d at 715; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-802(b) (Repl. 2012). 
 301. Pulliam, 2016 Ark. App. 133, at 6, 485 S.W.3d at 715; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-
802. 
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cited by the court.304 This case points out the inherent conflicts involved 
with family members serving as trustees of the trusts that benefit them. The 
terms of the trust that allowed family members to purchase trust land for 
themselves almost guaranteed that disagreement would arise. 
Trustees have a default duty to account on at least an annual basis.305 
The Bell v. Bank of America case gives guidance to institutional fiduciaries 
as to how detailed they must be in accounting for attorney’s fees.306 In this 
case, beneficiaries (one of whom later became a successor trustee) sued to 
terminate a trust and also sued the trustee, Bank of America, alleging mis-
management.307 Bank of America successfully defended itself and the 
trust.308 After resigning as trustee and turning the trust funds over to its suc-
cessor, it later accounted for an eleven-month period, showing receipts, dis-
bursements and distributions, including more than $22,000 in attorney’s fees 
incurred in the litigation.309 The Bells sought an itemized list of the attor-
ney’s fees.310 The court viewed the itemization in chambers and approved 
payment of the fees and the accounting but denied the Bells access to the 
itemization.311 The court of appeals agreed, noting the general rule that bene-
ficiaries are entitled to information reasonably necessary to allow them to 
enforce their rights under the trust.312 Here, there was no finding of misman-
agement and the Bells had been reasonably informed of the fees.313 
An often-difficult question arises in the case of discretionary support 
trusts, where a trustee has the discretion as to how much to distribute to ben-
eficiaries within the guidelines of some type of standard. Beneficiaries may 
also have assets of their own, which raises the issue of whether the trustee 
should take the beneficiaries’ own assets into account when making distri-
butions. Although not addressed by the ATC, this issue is covered by both 
the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Trusts. Arkansas law on this issue 
arguably changed in 2008 in Carmody v. Betts.314 In Carmody, a testamen-
tary trust for the benefit of the settlor’s sister provided that during her life 
she was to receive any part of the trust income “necessary to provide for her 
care, welfare, and maintenance.”315 The settlor expressed his intent, twice, to 
provide for the sister from the trust income if possible, but also directed the 
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trustees to invade the principal if necessary.316 Undistributed income was to 
become part of the principal, and the bulk of the remainder was to be paid to 
the Metropolitan Opera Company and to Georgetown University.317 
After the beneficiary’s death, her estate sued the trustees, alleging that 
the trustees breached the trust by taking the beneficiary’s own interests into 
account.318 The circuit court construed the will to mean that the beneficiary’s 
own interests must be taken into account. On appeal, the court of appeals 
explained prior law: 
Prior Arkansas cases construing trust language about the distribution of 
income and principal for the support of a beneficiary have held that 
phrases such as “necessary for support” were presumed to mean that the 
trustee was to use the money for that purpose regardless of the benefi-




But the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has reversed the presumption: 
It is important to ascertain whether a trustee, in determining the distribu-
tions to be made to a beneficiary under an objective standard (such as a 
support standard), (i) is required to take account of the beneficiary’s oth-
er resources, (ii) is prohibited from doing so, or (iii) is to consider the 
other resources but has some discretion in the matter. If the trust provi-
sions do not address the question, the general rule of construction pre-
sumes the last of these. 
Specifically . . . the presumption is that the trustee is to take the benefi-
ciary’s other resources into account in determining whether and in what 
amounts distributions are to be made, except insofar as, in the trustee’s 
discretionary judgment, the settlor’s intended treatment of the benefi-
ciary or the purposes of the trust will in some respect be better accom-
plished by not doing so.
320
 
The Restatement drafters believe the new presumption more accurately 
reflects settlors’ intent.321 However, the Carmody court did not apply the 
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new Restatement section, instead relying on the express trust language that 
indicated the settlor wished if possible to limit distributions to income.322 
J. Attorney’s Fees 
“In a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, a 
court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney’s fees, to any party, to be paid by another par-
ty or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy.”323 This section 
will briefly summarize decisions that have awarded attorney’s fees in con-
nection with ATC issues. 
1. Fees Paid by the Trustee 
Where a custodial bank named as a successor trustee attempted to de-
cline the position and refused to account for trust assets, but was ruled to be 
the trustee because it had acted as one, the bank individually was ordered to 
pay almost $10,000 worth of attorney’s fees.324 The Court of Appeals of 
Arkansas affirmed because had the bank performed the accounting, no fees 
would have been incurred.325 
2. Fees Paid by the Executor 
Taylor v. Woods involved a factually complicated case wherein a wid-
ow will and trust beneficiary sued the co-executors, two children of the de-
ceased husband, and the attorney who had drafted the will and five testa-
mentary trusts.326 She asked for an accounting, removal of the executors, a 
determination of which property passed by will and which through the 
trusts, and attorney’s fees.327 The court of appeals affirmed the award of fees 
against two of the co-executors individually.328 The ATC gives a court dis-
cretion to award attorney’s fees against any party in a case involving the 
administration of a trust.329 Deciding whether property passed under the will 
or under the testamentary trust involved administration of the trust and so 
the ATC applied.330 
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3. Fees Governed by Other State’s Law 
In Calvert v. Estate of Calvert, the son of a trust beneficiary sued the 
trustees alleging that he was a beneficiary of the trust and that the trustees 
had breached the trust.331 The trust’s governing law was that of Texas and 
the court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in applying Arkansas 
law regarding the trustees’ petition for attorney’s fees rather than Texas 
law.332 
4. Reasonableness of Fees 
A post-ATC decision that addresses fees in a trust case in more detail 
than any other is Shula v. Bank of America, an unpublished federal district 
court order.333 In this case, the plaintiff beneficiary and decedent had di-
vorced.334 The divorce agreement ordered the plaintiff’s alimony and 
maintenance to be paid via a trust funded by the decedent.335 Prior to his 
death, the decedent’s business went bankrupt and the financing of the trust 
was changed in several ways.336 After the decedent’s death, the plaintiff sued 
the trustee, Bank of America, for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and declaratory relief, alleging that the changes breached the trust 
agreement and damaged her.337 The federal district court ruled her claim to 
be premature and ordered summary judgment against her.338 Bank of Ameri-
ca asked for $275,000 in attorney’s fees.339 The district court reduced the 
fees, but applied Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 rather than 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-1004.340 The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the summary judgment but remanded on the issue of fees.341 
Applying the ATC fees provision, the district court approved hourly 
rates for two of the defense counselors because they were in line with rates 
of other Little Rock attorneys with similar experience.342 It noted the simple 
issues at the core of the case, although it acknowledged that the attorneys’ 
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difficulty was increased because of the distrust between the parties.343 It 
deemed entries for phone calls and conferences unreasonable if they did not 
explain the nature of the calls and conferences.344 It reduced claims for tasks 
that seemed redundant, such as multiple retrievals and reviews of court rec-
ords.345 It struck the bill for one of two attorneys flying to Florida to take the 
plaintiff’s deposition.346 It struck the fees for a “defense counsel who attend-
ed another trial in order to determine the policies and procedures of this 
court.”347 Finally, after reviewing the records, the hourly rates of the lawyers 
(thirteen lawyers and paralegals worked on the case), and complexity of the 
case, the court arrived at $150,000 for fees and $9,300 in expenses.348 This 
was billed to the plaintiff and not the trust.349 
The takeaway from this detailed opinion is to be sure to document all 
tasks sufficiently, be mindful of providing such documentation, in particular 
if tasks appear to be duplicative or unnecessary, be conservative in assigning 
multiple attorneys to the same tasks, especially if it involves out-of-town 
travel, and do not charge for unreasonable expenses like sending an attorney 
to observe the judge in another trial. 
III. OTHER SIGNIFICANT TRUST LAW 
Trust law issues arising during the last decade that are not within the 
scope of the ATC, yet are of importance to those who practice in the trust 
and estates area, are discussed below. First is one of the most important de-
cisions in the last decade, enabling spouses defrauded of their elective share 
to include revocable trust assets in the decedent’s estate for elective share 
purposes. Second is a discussion of the growing number of cases involving 
“in terrorem,” or no-contest, clauses. Third is a case that affected real estate 
transfers far more than estate planners, by construing the homestead exemp-
tion to be included in revocable trusts. Fourth are cases involving “trusts” 
that are not really trusts at all—constructive trusts and resulting trusts. The 
section concludes with a brief discussion of issues for potential legislation. 
A. Spousal Elective Share Extended to Revocable Trusts  
The most significant change in Arkansas trust law in the last decade, 
outside of the enactment of the ATC, concerns the spousal elective share. At 
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the beginning of the American republic, surviving spouses were entitled to 
dower or curtesy depending on their sex, unless they lived in a community 
property state. As time went on and more wealth was held in personal prop-
erty, virtually all non-community property states enacted elective share stat-
utes, entitling the surviving spouse to a share of the decedent’s probate es-
tate if the surviving spouse chose to take against the will.350 As inter vivos 
trusts became more popular, some states, by case law or statute, began to 
include inter vivos trust assets within the pool of assets that would be sub-
ject to the elective share.351 Theories relied on were that the transfer to a 
trust was “illusory” or a “fraud on the elective share.”352 The most compli-
cated scheme, the UPC’s “augmented estate,” allows the surviving spouse a 
share of the trust assets, the size of which depends on the length of the mar-
riage and the percent of pooled assets owned by the surviving spouse. Assets 
potentially subject to the elective share include the probate estate, survivor-
ship property, payable upon death (POD) property and transfer on death 
(TOD) property, and proceeds of insurance.353 
Arkansas steadfastly held to its elective share, which is identical to the 
intestate share of a surviving spouse: statutory dower or curtesy (a percent-
age of what is in the probate estate), homestead, if applicable, and the statu-
tory allowance.354 Arkansas lawyers studied the dictum from Richards v. 
Worthen Bank and wondered when, if ever, the courts would decide that by 
transferring the bulk of one’s assets into an inter vivos trust, fraud had oc-
curred, thereby allowing a surviving spouse to elect against the trust assets 
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as well as the probate estate.355 That day finally came with the decision in In 
re Estate of Thompson.356 
In Thompson, the decedent executed a revocable trust in 2002 that 
made his wife a co-trustee and at his death gave her income for life (from a 
trust valued at $6 million), the right to invade the principal in case of ex-
traordinary circumstances, and annual “five by five” powers.357 The widow 
testified that she gave up her nursing career after marriage at the decedent’s 
request because he promised to take care of her.358 By 2008, the couple had 
decided to live apart temporarily while their home was being repaired.359 
The widow was suffering from cancer at the time, and after they moved 
apart, she suffered a stroke.360 The decedent had serious health problems, 
and so his spouse moved him to an assisted-living facility, where he stayed 
until he died in 2010.361 
The court noted that at first when they were together, he “showered her 
with gifts of great value.”362 Over time, he provided less support, until when 
they lived separately she had to file for separate maintenance.363 In the last 
trust amendment, executed a few months before the decedent died, she was 
no longer a co-trustee; in fact, she was not even given a copy of the trust 
instrument.364 Out of the estate of over $6 million, she would receive a de-
vise of $100,000, but only if she did not contest the will or trust.365 The trial 
court found that the decedent intended to defraud her of her spousal elective 
share.366 Key factors here were the great difference between Thompson’s 
share under the first two trusts contrasted with her share under the final 
trust, the loss of her status as co-trustee, the execution of the last trust while 
the decedent was in a nursing home, and its execution so close to his 
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death,and the fact that Thompson received copies of the earlier wills and 
trusts but not of the last set.367 The circuit court noted that these were evi-
dence of the decedent’s intent to deprive Thompson of her statutory rights 
and keep her uninformed.368 The Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with 
both the circuit court’s ruling and its analysis.369 On appeal the estate argued 
that the surviving spouse had not argued the elements of common-law 
fraud.370 The court responded that “fraud in the classic sense” was not at 
issue here.371 The effect of the fraud was to include the trust assets in the 
probate estate for purposes of calculating the amount of the elective share 
(in this case because there were no children the surviving spouse would get 
half).372 Otherwise, the disposition of the trust would remain the same.373 
Some of the questions raised by Thompson are whether future decisions 
might extend property subject to the elective share to other non-probate 
transfers, like POD and TOD accounts or survivorship property. The deci-
sion should lead to more reliance on prenuptial agreements and less reliance 
on revocable trusts in estate planning. This is an issue on which legislation 
codifying the supreme court’s decision and setting some agreed-on parame-
ters would be helpful to estate planners and clients. 
B. The Terror of a No-Contest Clause  
“In terrorem” or “no-contest” provisions of wills and trusts are intend-
ed to discourage contests. Almost all states recognize them.374 The UPC 
states that such provisions are enforceable unless “probable cause” other-
wise exists.375 Arkansas recognizes them, and during the last ten years, sev-
eral decisions interpreting no-contest clauses have been decided, leading one 
to wonder if litigation over them is increasing because of increased use, or 
simply because with (1) more and more blended marriages and (2) surviving 
second or third spouses and children from prior marriages, the potential for 
contests is increasing. This section discusses cases involving both wills and 
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trusts because Arkansas courts’ analysis of the two does not differ in any 
way. 
An example of a simple no-contest clause is “in the event any benefi-
ciary under this trust should challenge the validity of any provision of this 
trust for any reason, then the share of such beneficiary will be forfeited and 
added to the shares of the remaining beneficiaries pro rata.” Some testators 
and settlors include additional penalties. For example, one testator stated 
that “I direct if any court shall invalidate the above referenced disinheritance 
provision, said Judge should be removed from any determination regarding 
the interpretation of this Will and its validity and from the probate of my 
Estate.”376 
Some testators and settlors expand the scope of prohibited acts beyond 
the act of just a contest. For example, in Hamm v. Hamm, the no-contest 
clause additionally prohibited will beneficiaries from “[refusing] to execute 
a waiver of inventory and accounting.”377 Six years after opening the estate, 
Lynda, the personal representative, residual beneficiary and sister of the 
decedent, petitioned to disinherit the decedent’s brother, Jerry, who was to 
receive five acres, a metal shop building, and grain bins under the will.378 
The petition alleged that Jerry had proffered another will, failed to file a 
waiver of inventory and accounting, and filed a claim against the estate.379 
Three days later, Jerry filed the waiver.380 
In denying Lynda’s petition to disinherit, the court explained that Jerry 
proffered a 2000 will because he did not know about the later, subsequently 
probated, 2005 will. Jerry did file the waiver and, although late, the failure 
to file earlier resulted in no prejudice. Finally, Jerry withdrew the claim 
against the estate, even though the trial court questioned whether that action 
would trigger the no-contest clause at all.381 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas noted that the will did not 
set a time limit for the filing of the waiver.382 It then cited the standard rule 
of construction for no-contest clauses: that they are to be narrowly con-
strued, because applying such a clause will result in a forfeiture.383 The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to apply the no-contest 
clause.384 
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The no-contest clause in Peterson v. Peck was even broader. In Peter-
son, the decedent’s trust, which nominated his second wife Hannah as his 
successor trustee, cancelled gifts to any of his children (from a previous 
marriage) or their issue who challenged any trust provisions, attacked the 
validity of the trust, or attempted to remove or questioned any of the actions 
of his widow as trustee.385 The decedent’s daughter Capi alleged that Han-
nah (1) sold a multi-million dollar Calder mobile in which the decedent had 
given a remainder to Capi during his lifetime; (2) asked for an accounting; 
and (3) requested damages to restore funds to the trust that were allegedly 
lost by Hannah’s investment in a Ponzi scheme (which Hannah acknowl-
edged).386 
Although Capi proffered a letter conveying the mobile to her, the trial 
court found that no gift had been given. Further, there was no evidence that 
Hannah had acted recklessly or in bad faith. The trial court ruled that Capi 
had forfeited her interest in the trust, by triggering the no-contest clause.387 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas noted the strict-
construction rule and, citing cases from other states as authority, first decid-
ed that Capi’s claim of ownership of the Calder mobile was independent of 
the trust, and did not trigger the no-contest clause.388 Second, and somewhat 
disturbingly, the court then went on to state that “[Capi’s] complaint sought 
to have Hannah Peck provide accountings and to pay damages to replenish 
the trust. Clearly, these allegations questioned Hannah Peck’s actions as 
trustee and asked the court to control her actions as trustee, triggering the 
share-cancellation [no-contest] provision.”389 
This statement by the court raises some concerns. The court character-
izes requesting an accounting, an act that was not expressly forbidden by the 
no-contest provision, as an act questioning a trustee’s actions. But a trustee 
has a duty to account.390 Asking a trustee to carry out a duty should not be 
characterized as an action adverse to a trustee. Would a provision in a no-
contest clause expressly forbidding beneficiaries from requesting an ac-
counting be enforced by a court? After all, the duty to account (now called 
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“inform and report”) is not mandatory under the ATC.391 However, a trustee 
has a common-law duty to account reasonably to beneficiaries. After all, 
rendering a trustee completely free from any duty to account whatsoever 
effectively destroys the trust. As Bogert states, “there is a fundamental and 
irreconcilable contradiction to a settlor purporting to create a trust with re-
spect to which the trustee is not accountable.”392 In other words, drafters and 
courts should be aware that the common law of trusts may provide a “floor” 
under which an extremely broad no-contest clause cannot fall. A no-contest 
clause cannot make duties like loyalty and accounting completely disappear. 
“Even if the terms of a trust attempt to completely exculpate a trustee for the 
trustee’s acts, the trustee must always comply with a certain minimum 
standard.”393 
Furthermore, a consideration courts should make in this context is that 
a no-contest clause in a trust, much more so than in a will, functions as a 
type of exculpatory clause for the trustee. By including a laundry list of trig-
gering acts, a drafter can insulate a breaching trustee from scrutiny by a 
court. Before drafting such no-contest clauses, clients should be advised as 
to their potential effects, and courts should not enforce them if the effect is 
to vitiate the trust itself. 
The most recent decision discussing no-contest provisions in detail is 
Seymour v. Biehslich.394 This case and Sharp v. Sharp,395 discussed below, 
clarify to some extent what “contest” can and cannot mean in the context of 
a no-contest provision. In Seymour, the no-contest provision prohibited only 
a “contest” of the testator’s will.396 A month and a half after probate was 
initiated and the court accepted the decedent’s will, one of his daughters, 
Seymour, filed a second petition for probate and offered a handwritten at-
tested will, although the handwriting was that of Seymour and not the dece-
dent, and the will named Seymour as the remainder beneficiary, giving 
small devises to her siblings.397 The daughter who had filed the original will 
and been appointed personal representative, Beihslich, moved to exclude 
Seymour from receiving any distribution.398 Seymour argued that she had 
not contested the will, but the trial court found that she had triggered the 
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clause.399 She argued on appeal that she had not contested the will, noting 
that Arkansas statutory law describes a contest as “stating in writing the 
grounds of . . . objection and filing them with the court.”400 She claimed she 
was ignorant of the first will.401 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas next summarized two previous no-
contest cases beginning with Lytle v. Zebold.402 Here, the court held that a 
lawsuit challenging the validity of a testamentary trust triggered the no-
contest clause by challenging the validity of the testamentary scheme.403 In 
Jackson v. Braden, a probate petition challenging the executor’s failure to 
obtain appraisals or confirmations of leases and sales of mineral interests did 
not trigger the no-contest clause (a much narrower clause than that in Peter-
son), because it was filed after the time for filing a contest had expired, and 
moreover the beneficiaries acknowledged the will’s validity and were mere-
ly questioning the executor’s noncompliance with the probate code.404 
The UPC renders no-contest provisions in wills and trusts unenforcea-
ble if “probable cause” exists for institution of a contest.405 Without citing 
the Probate Code, the Seymour court next cited Oklahoma authority stating 
that the “consensus rule” is that no-contest provisions should not be en-
forced if the contestant has “probable cause” to contest because of forgery 
or subsequent revocation.406 A “good faith” attempt to probate a later will 
should not trigger the clause.407 However, a “bad-faith” attempt to probate a 
will known not to be genuine should trigger the clause.408 Could the bad-
faith offer of a fraudulent will trigger the no-contest clause of a second will 
that is later offered to probate, and cause the no-contest clause in the latter 
to relate back? 
Examining the facts of the instant case, here the court noted that Sey-
mour procured the will and the witnesses were her friends.409 Citing the une-
ven distribution that favored Seymour, the court noted “ample evidence” in 
the record that Seymour was not acting in good faith when she proffered the 
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later will.410 Thus, Seymour represents a bad-faith attempt to probate a will 
known not to be genuine. The court also mentions that the Court of Appeals 
of Colorado notes as a factor bearing on the existence of probable cause 
whether the proponent has relied on the advice of disinterested counsel, after 
full disclosure of the facts.411 
In a later case, Sharp v. Sharp, a father died, survived by one son who 
lived close by, James, and another son who lived in Texas, Gary.412 The fa-
ther’s original 2007 will divided his estate equally between the sons.413 In 
2010, the father executed a new will that left furniture and $100,000 to 
Gary, and farm equipment, automobiles, all real property (several hundred 
acres of farmland) and the residue to James.414 The 2010 will also contained 
a no-contest clause.415 At the same time, the father changed several financial 
accounts that would pass outside of probate.416 Most went to James or his 
sons, but a certificate of deposit for $100,000 would go to Gary.417 At the 
father’s death, James petitioned to probate the 2010 will and to be appointed 
executor of the estate.418 Gary filed a will contest, alleging a confidential 
relationship, procurement and undue influence.419 
James admitted to a confidential relationship, but denied the procure-
ment.420 The trial court concluded that there was no procurement or undue 
influence, and that the 2010 will was valid.421 Gary subsequently petitioned, 
inter alia, for the court to find the no-contest provision unenforceable be-
cause he “pursued the will contest in good faith with probable cause,” rely-
ing on Seymour v. Biehslich as authority.422 The Sharp court characterized 
the introduction of another will in Seymour as an “indirect” contest, and 
Gary’s action as a “direct” contest.423 The court noted nothing in Gary’s 
action to distinguish it from the “myriad” of cases enforcing no-contest 
clauses.424 
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These two cases, taken together, lay out some sound rules. A proponent 
of a will that is clearly the product of undue influence or procurement will 
trigger a no-contest clause in a valid will. A contest of a will later ruled to be 
valid will trigger a no-contest clause, no matter the good faith of the con-
testant. What is the contestant to do? One course of action might be to ob-
tain a declaratory judgment from the court as to whether an action will trig-
ger the no-contest clause. Another might be, as suggested in Seymour, to 
obtain the advice of a disinterested attorney. 
C. The Homestead in the Trust 
In 2010, real estate practitioners were surprised by the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas’s decision in Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, which intersects the 
topics of estate planning, conveyancing, and mortgage law.425 In Fitton, a 
man owned a home in Little Rock.426 Before he married, he conveyed it to 
himself and his wife-to-be as joint tenants with right of survivorship.427 Af-
ter their marriage, they each transferred their undivided joint tenancy inter-
ests into their own revocable trusts (thus severing the joint tenancy and ren-
dering them owners as trustees of tenancy in common interests).428 Seven 
years later they separated, and two days later the husband, both individually 
and as the trustee of his revocable trust, mortgaged his interest in the home 
to the Bank of Little Rock.429 The wife did not know about the mortgage.430 
The divorce settlement awarded her the husband’s interest in the home.431 
He conveyed it to her and she conveyed it to herself as trustee.432 The hus-
band then defaulted on the mortgage loan and the bank attempted to fore-
close against the home, arguing that as a trust beneficiary she could not 
claim homestead and that she had abandoned her homestead exemption by 
transferring the husband’s interest into her trust.433 She argued that she had 
no knowledge of the mortgage, and that under Arkansas Code Annotated 
section 18-12-403 a homestead mortgaged without the consent of the spouse 
renders the mortgage void.434 The trial court ruled that the statute voiding a 
transfer of a homestead by one spouse if the other does not release her inter-
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est requires the home to be owned by a married person, and here the home 
was owned by the trustees for two trusts.435 
Noting the goals of the homestead exemption—to protect the family 
and preserve the homestead—the court relied on a decision from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that stated in dictum that ben-
eficiaries of a trust should hold a homestead exemption; the homestead 
property tax discount, which applies to homesteads that are revocable trust 
assets; and the oft-repeated rule that the homestead exemption is to be con-
strued liberally.436 
D. The Edges of Trust Law—Constructive Trusts and Resulting Trusts 
Around the edges of trust law are hazy relationships, formed by poorly 
drafted instruments or no instruments at all, just oral agreements and under-
standings between parties. A declaration of trust or trust agreement should 
always be written, and yet the ATC allows the existence of an oral trust to 
be established by “clear and convincing evidence” unless another statute 
requires otherwise.437 The Statute of Frauds conceivably is such a statute. It 
requires all conveyances of real property and transfers of trust in real prop-
erty to be in writing to be enforceable.438 
On the other hand, a “constructive trust” is not really a trust at all, but a 
remedy that equity imposes on property.439 In order to avoid unjust enrich-
ment, or if there has been a breach of fiduciary duty or abuse of a confiden-
tial relationship, the law creates the fiction that the defendant holder is a 
“constructive” trustee, subsequently ordering the holder to convey the dis-
puted property to the plaintiff.440 One of the most helpful explanations of the 
constructive trust can be found in Scott’s treatise, quoted in Brasel v. Brasel. 
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It is not infrequently said that where a person would be unjustly enriched 
if he were permitted to retain property, a court of equity “converts him 
into a trustee.” The expression is misleading. The defendant is not con-
verted into a real trustee. He is not even treated as though he were a real 
trustee, except that he is not permitted to retain the property for his own 
benefit. One would hardly say that where a quasi-contractual obligation 
is imposed the court converts the defendant into a contractor, or converts 
the obligation into a contract.
441
 
For example, parents often entrust their property to their children as a 
gift, intending to receive its benefit or return in the future. The better prac-
tice is to memorialize such an arrangement in the appropriate instrument so 
that both sides have a record of their rights and responsibilities, but some-
times the parties do not create an instrument, leading to problems if litiga-
tion subsequently ensues. In Launius v. Beasley, parents transferred a certif-
icate of deposit and two tracts of real property to their daughter, with the 
desire that the property would not be counted as their assets should they 
later move to a nursing home.442 All parties agreed that the daughter was a 
good manager, and that she did not claim ownership of the property.443 After 
their relationship deteriorated, the parents asked the daughter to transfer the 
real property back to them and she refused.444 The parents then sought to 
impose a constructive trust on the property.445 
The trial court found that the “appellants voluntarily chose to transfer 
their assets to appellee, rather than create an express trust, but that it was 
understood by the parties that the transfers to appellee ‘were in trust for the 
primary benefit of the [appellants] and their son.’”446 The trial court found 
that the parents had created an oral trust.447 
On appeal, the parents argued alternatively that either a constructive 
trust should be imposed, in which case they would regain their property, or, 
that if an oral trust had been created, they had revoked it, and their revoca-
tion should be enforced by the court.448 Clear and convincing evidence is 
necessary to prove either an oral trust or the need for a constructive trust.449 
The Court of Appeals of Arkansas remanded the case because the trial 
court’s opinion was inconsistent, although the court of appeals did not ex-
 
 441. Brasel v. Brasel, 313 Ark. 337, 339, 854 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1993) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.1, at 312 (4th ed. 1989)). 
 442. Launius v. Beasley, 2013 Ark. App. 42, 2013 WL 361135. 
 443. Id. at 2, 2013 WL 361135, at *1. 
 444. Id. at 1. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. at 2. 
 447. Id. at 3, 2013 WL 361135, at *2. 
 448. Launius, 2013 Ark. App. 42, at 2, 2013 WL 361135, at *1. 
 449. Id. at 3, 4, 2013 WL 361135, at *2. 
348 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
plain the nature of the inconsistency, noting only that the trial court had held 
there was insufficient evidence of a constructive trust, yet found the exist-
ence of an oral trust.450 The trial court’s finding of an oral trust seems unjus-
tified from the facts given. The court of appeals did not discuss how, if at 
all, a settlor could create an express oral trust of real property. In fact, Ar-
kansas statutory law states that a deed to a grantee conveying to simply 
“John Doe, Trustee” without other language showing a trust (typically the 
name of the trust) vests title in the grantee and gives no notice to any third 
parties of the existence of a trust.451 It would seem, then, that under Arkan-
sas law a fee simple conveyance to a grantee, without more, is not sufficient 
to create an express oral trust, contrary to the trial court’s finding.452 The 
facts were conducive to the imposition of a constructive trust, however. 
Constructive trusts are often classified as one of the two types of “im-
plied trusts,” although it was noted in Scott on Trusts, quoted above, that to 
call a constructive trust a trust at all is extremely misleading. The other type 
of implied trust is the “resulting trust,” which has three meanings, encom-
passing three very different sets of facts. A resulting trust is formed (1) 
where a private or charitable trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where proper-
ty is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and, at his di-
rection, the vendor transfers the property to another person; or (3) where a 
private or charitable trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust 
estate.453 The first two types of resulting trusts featured in two 2014 Court of 
Appeals of Arkansas cases.454 Many commentators label the second type a 
“purchase-money resulting trust.”455 For clarity’s sake I will do so here, alt-
hough oftentimes Arkansas courts do not. 
The first type of resulting trust arose in In re Estate of Kemp.456 In this 
case, a son’s revocable inter vivos trust made his parents’ trusts the benefi-
ciaries.457 However, the parents predeceased the son, and at his death he was 
survived by no readily ascertainable heirs (although twenty were later locat-
ed, eight of whom retained counsel and became parties to the suit).458 Bank 
of America was the trustee of the son’s trust and it filed in Craighead Coun-
ty (where the decedent neither lived nor owned property) to terminate the 
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trust and distribute the assets to the heirs.459 However, First National Bank, 
the special administrator of the estate, filed a motion in Randolph County 
seeking a probate court order to Bank of America to pay the trust assets to 
the probate estate.460 Bank of America disagreed, arguing that it could pay 
the heirs directly.461 The Randolph County court and the court of appeals 
agreed with First National Bank.462 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, one authority cited in 
the opinion, a resulting trust is “a reversionary, equitable interest implied by 
law in property that is held by a transferee, in whole or in part, as trustee for 
the transferor or the transferor’s successors in interest.”463 For example, if 
Settlor were to create an inter vivos trust that failed, because some or all of 
the beneficial interest could not be effectively transferred, a resulting (or 
“reverting”) trust would be created and the trustee would then convey the 
property back to Settlor. Here, if the son had left a will, the trust assets 
would have passed through probate under the residue. Instead, because the 
son died intestate, the assets would go via probate to the heirs, as First Na-
tional Bank argued.464 
In the second decision, McNeill v. Robbins, involving what the court 
deemed a purchase-money trust, a mother transferred property to herself and 
her son as joint tenants with right of survivorship.465 She later purchased an 
additional tract that was titled in the same way.466 Her intention for these 
transfers changed over time; originally she had intended the transfers to as-
sist her son in building capital and procuring other property.467 Later when 
those plans did not materialize, she intended the properties to pass to him at 
his death.468 At no time did she intend her son to have a present legal interest 
in the properties.469 The son later attempted to partition the property and the 
mother counterclaimed.470 The trial court found either a constructive trust 
existed, ordering the son to convey all necessary deeds to his mother, or a 
resulting trust existed, ordering the deeds to be set aside.471 
After an appeal by the son, the court of appeals gave a somewhat mis-
leading definition of resulting trust: one that arises when “one disposes of 
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property under circumstances raising an inference that he or she does not 
intend that the putative grantee should have a beneficial interest in the prop-
erty.”472 This definition comes from Edwards v. Edwards, which then goes 
on to clearly define a purchase-money resulting trust as one that “arises 
where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person 
and at his/her direction the vendor converts the property to another per-
son.”473 A purchaser pays the consideration but the property is conveyed to a 
third party who is a stranger. The law presumes the conveyance to be in trust 
to the third party for the benefit of the actual purchaser. But if (as in 
McNeill) the third party is a natural object of the bounty of the purchaser, 
then a gift rather than a trust may have been intended.474 
Not only did the McNeill court not include the specific definitions and 
explanations of a purchase-money resulting trust, but also it applied the rule 
to a situation where there was no purchase. Six of the seven parcels already 
belonged to the mother, so the purchase-money resulting trust doctrine could 
not be applied to them. Also, somewhat confusingly, the court of appeals 
agreed with the trial court’s finding that the mother had no intent to transfer 
present title, either legal or equitable, to the son.475 It affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling that a resulting trust had been created, which the son breached 
when he sued for partition.476 
The doctrines of “constructive trust” and “purchase money resulting 
trust” are helpful arguments to make when trying to enforce a transferor’s 
intent, if the transferor has not used the appropriate instrument or if subse-
quent developments have thwarted a plan. Rather than a deed or oral agree-
ment, a parent should consider a beneficiary deed, will, or inter vivos trust, 
any one of which will cost less than litigation. Such an instrument, which 
transfers either an expectancy or a vested remainder subject to divestment, 
will usually not have potentially expensive tax consequences, because it will 
afford the transferee the step up in basis, which will result in less income tax 
if the transferee sells the property after the transfer. On the other hand, if an 
inter vivos transfer has the potential to remove significant appreciation from 
the estate and avoid the consequential estate tax on the appreciation, and the 
beneficiaries intend to keep the property rather than sell it, an inter vivos 
transfer may be advisable. 
 
 472. Id. at 3, 2014 WL 1396655, at *2 (citing Edwards v. Edwards, 311 Ark. 339, 843 
S.W.2d 846 (1992)). 
 473. Edwards, 311 Ark. at 343, 843 S.W.2d at 849. 
 474. See id. at 344, 843 S.W.2d at 849. 
 475. McNeill, 2014 Ark. App. 222, at 4–5, 2014 WL 1396655, at *2–3. That would actu-
ally mean that nothing had been transferred to the son, in terms of trust analysis, because the 
trustee holds legal title and the beneficiary holds equitable title. 
 476. Although, if the son was a purchase money resulting trustee he would have present 
legal title. 
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E. On the Horizon—Legislative Reforms 
As the number of trusts continues to increase, interest is growing in 
legislation to deal with problem areas in trust law. As mentioned above, 
interest by trustees in trust decanting has grown. Decanting gives a trustee 
(not a beneficiary) discretion to modify an existing irrevocable trust or cre-
ate a new trust that receives the funds of the old.477 Reasons for decanting 
will typically be variations on mistake or changed conditions—a case in 
point was the need to change a trust to a special-needs trust in the Owen 
case.478 A successful decanting is intended to avoid adverse federal estate, 
generation-skipping transfer, and income tax consequences.479 The source of 
decanting authority may be case law, statutes, or a specific trust provision 
that allows it.480 A detailed description of decanting is outside the scope of 
this article, but those interested in it are encouraged to view the Uniform 
Trust Decanting Act and comments, and the growing body of articles on the 
topic.481 
With the ability to delegate trust duties afforded by the UTC and the 
increased use of trust advisors and protectors, there is much uncertainty 
about the duties and liability of specialized trustees and nontrustees. The 
Uniform Law Commission is currently drafting the Uniform Divided Trus-
teeship Act, which will adequately address this issue.482 
One issue that regularly arises in Arkansas trust law is divorce. A di-
vorce revokes a devise to a spouse by operation of law.483 Yet there is no 
parallel provision in Arkansas law for trusts. Thus, if a husband named his 
wife as a successor trustee and beneficiary of a revocable trust and later di-
vorced, and if by chance the trust was not mentioned in the property settle-
ment or later expressly revoked, when the ex-husband died the ex-wife 
would at least be a trust beneficiary, although probably she could be re-
moved as trustee. There is a current need for a parallel revocation statute for 
inter vivos trusts. 
Some legislative fleshing out of the precedent from the Estate of 
Thompson decision would also render more certainty for estate planners. Is 
the decision to be limited to revocable trusts? Will it be extended to other 
 
 477. Brandon A.S. Ross, Practical Considerations for Decanting, PROB. & PROP., Mar.–
Apr. 2016, at 36. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. at 37–38. 
 481. See UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trustdecanting/UTDA_Final%20Act.pdf. 
 482. For current drafts and discussion documents see http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/divided%20trusteeship/2015mar_DTA_Mtg%20Draft.pdf. 
 483. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (Repl. 2012). 
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types of nonprobate transfers, like POD bank accounts? Will the factors for 
fraud be clarified? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After ten years, the ATC has become a familiar part of the landscape of 
trust planning, administration, and litigation. The number of revocable trust 
cases has steadily grown and will continue to do so. Frequently litigated 
issues are attorney’s fees, revocation and amendment powers of a surviving 
spouse over a joint trust, and modification and termination of trusts. As 
more and more surviving spouses and children become trustees of formerly 
revocable trusts, the number of disputes between family members, and be-
tween families and institutional trustees, will increase. Clients should be 
counseled thoroughly on the responsibilities resulting from acceptance of a 
trusteeship of an irrevocable trust (or a trust that will later become irrevoca-
ble). Should explicit differing standards for professional and non-
professional trustees be set forth?484 Hopefully this guide to how courts are 
interpreting the ATC and making new trust law will be of use to drafters as 
they seek to carry out their clients’ wishes without triggering disputes and 
litigation. 
 
 484. For an interesting article in which Professor Melanie Leslie argues that certain trus-
tee duties should differ for non-professional trustees, see Common Law, Common Sense: 
Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 (2006). 
